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I. INTRODUCTION
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA" or "the
Act"), an act that extends twelve weeks leave to employees for cer-
tain medical and family situations, seemed like a panacea for the
everyday battles employees face in balancing work and family
needs.' At last, the Act's supporters thought, an employee can take
time off to care for a loved one, or have a child, and return to find
his or her job intact. In the eight years since its enactment, how-
ever, the FMLA finds employees and employers alike disillusioned,
uncertain about rights and obligations, and still fighting to balance
work and family needs by being forced to follow the FMLA's com-
plex procedures. Furthermore, the FMLA and accompanying regu-
lations provide attorneys and judges with a great deal of confusion
in reconciling seemingly conflicting provisions.
This Term, the Supreme Court will hear its first case ever
under the FMLA and will hopefully give employers, employees, and
lower courts needed guidance on interpreting the delicate balance
between business and families that Congress sought to achieve. 2
Currently, several U.S. circuit courts disagree over the validity of a
Department of Labor ("DOL") regulation promulgated to preserve
employees' rights upon taking FMLA leave ("29 C.F.R. §
825.208(c)"). 3 The regulation requires that employers designate
qualifying leave as "FMLA leave" at the beginning of the leave pe-
riod.4 If an employer fails to notify employees of the FMLA designa-
tion, none of the absence preceding proper notice counts toward the
employee's twelve-week entitlement under the FMLA. 5 As a result,
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994) (listing purposes of the FMLA, including "balanc[ing] the
demands of the workplace with the needs of families"); Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc.,
218 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2548 (2001) (mem.).
3. Compare Ragsdale, 218 F.3d at 939 (holding 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) invalid) and
McGregor v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 1305, 1308 (1lth Cir. 1999) (holding same section invalid),
with Plant v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 935 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding same section).
4. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a) (2000).
5. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c).
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without proper notice regarding designation of leave as "FMLA
leave," an employee could receive more than twelve weeks total
leave.
All three circuit courts that have faced the issue, and nu-
merous district courts, examined the agency interpretation under
the well-established Chevron test.6 In the unanimous Chevron deci-
sion, the Supreme Court established a two-step test applicable to
judicial review of agency interpretations of agency-administered
regulations. 7 As will be detailed later in this Note, the Chevron test
provides courts with a vehicle to determine whether Congress has
left a gap in a statutory scheme for an agency to fill with regula-
tions, and whether the agency's subsequent regulations comport
with congressional intent.8
The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have invalidated the regu-
lation as contrary to the FMLA language and congressional intent
to provide only twelve weeks of leave. 9 The Sixth Circuit, however,
has held that the FMLA statute does not speak to the issue of em-
ployer notice of FMLA designation, and therefore, the DOL regula-
tion evinces a permissible and reasonable construction of the stat-
ute and is valid.10 The Supreme Court will resolve the conflict in the
2001-2002 Term by reviewing the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc.
This Note will first briefly sketch the statutory and adminis-
trative scheme that the FMLA creates and provide an illustrative
example. Next, it will examine the reasoning behind the cases that
make up this circuit split. While the flexible language of the Chev-
ron test can support either result, this Note contends that the con-
stitutional principles behind the Chevron test demand the invalida-
tion of the section of the regulation that potentially allows more
than twelve weeks of leave." Finally, this Note will elaborate upon
these constitutional principles and Congress's deliberate policy
choices in enacting the FMLA, which in this case should not be
changed or improved by the DOL's interpretation. This Note advo-
cates invalidating the current version of 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) as
6. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
7. See id. at 842-43.
8. See id.
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (1994) ("[Ain eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of
12 workweeks of leave. . . ." (emphasis added)); Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d
933, 939 (8th Cir. 2000), cert.granted, 121 S.Ct. 2548 (2001) (mem.); McGregor v. AutoZone, Inc.,
180 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 1999).
10. See Plant v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 935 (6th Cir. 2000).
11. See infra Part VI.A (detailing the constitutional principles of the Chevron test).
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contrary to the FMLA because the regulation potentially allows
employees more than twelve weeks of leave when Congress made a
deliberate and controversial choice to allow only twelve weeks of
leave.
II. THE FMLA SCHEME
A. The Purpose of the FMLA
The enactment of the FMLA represented a fundamental
change in the way American employers were required to acknowl-
edge and accommodate employees and their family needs. 12 As the
number of working women, single-parent households, and aging
relatives increased, American workers felt compelled to choose be-
tween their jobs and families. 13 Congress found that the family unit
suffered without parental participation in both early childbearing
and the care of family members. 14 Congress further acknowledged
that the choice between work and family affected women more than
men, and therefore, often encouraged gender discrimination. 15
Given these findings, Congress created a statutory scheme to "bal-
ance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to
promote the stability and economic security of families, and to pro-
mote national interests in preserving family integrity."1 6 Further-
more-and significantly-Congress sought to accomplish this pur-
pose in a manner that "accommodates the legitimate interests of
employers. "17
12. Jane Rigler, Analysis and Understanding of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,
45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 457, 458 (1995). Before the enactment of the FMLA, the United States
was virtually the only industrialized country without a nationalized leave policy to require em-
ployers to provide some form of maternity or parental leave. Id. at 461. The legislative history of
the statute indicated that the impetus for the FMLA was the dramatic shift in demographics of
the working population, including the increase in number of women in the workforce and single-
parent households, and the aging of the American population. Id. at 459-60.
13. Id.
14. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2) (1994); Rigler, supra
note 12, at 460-61 (citing S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 6 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 8).
15. See § 2601(a)(2).
16. § 2601(b)(1); see also Cristina Duarte, The Family & Medical Leave Act of 1993: Paying
the Price for an Imperfect Solution, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 833, 838-39 (1994) (noting that
granting job-protected leave legitimates family concerns by creating an "ambiance of acceptance
and respect for the workers" and preserves the employees' professional integrity); Rigler, supra
note 12, at 469 ("The essence of the FMLA is the concept of job security . .
17. § 2601(b)(3).
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B. The Provisions of the FMLA
This attempt to craft a balance between employer and em-
ployee needs resulted in a statutory scheme similar to that of other
labor laws that establish minimum standards for employment, such
as child labor laws, the minimum wage, and the Social Security
Act.' 8 Essentially, the FMLA entitles "eligible employees" 19 of "cov-
ered employers" 20 to a minimum of twelve weeks leave each year for
one or more of the following situations: birth and care of a newborn;
adoption or foster care of a child; care of a family member with a
serious health condition; and an employee's own serious health con-
dition. 21 The statute is notably vague regarding the definition of a
"serious health condition," leaving the DOL to fill in the gaps. 22
The FMLA requires employees to satisfy certain minimal no-
tice and certification requirements regarding the reason for leave. 23
At the same time, the FMLA imposes notice requirements on the
employer to ensure that employees are aware of their FMLA
rights.24 The statutory notice requirement for the employer includes
only the display of a poster with certain excerpts from the FMLA to
inform employees of their rights.25 As will be discussed in the next
18. Rigler, supra note 12, at 461 (citing S. REP. No. 103-3, at 4 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 21).
19. An "eligible employee" has worked for the employer for twelve months and for at least
1,250 hours of service during the previous twelve-month period. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (1994).
20. The FMLA only covers employers who employ fifty or more employees for each working
day during each of twenty or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar
year. § 2611(4)(A). Requiring more than fifty employees serves to extend coverage only to em-
ployers engaged in interstate commerce. Rigler, supra note 12, at 463. The Seventh Circuit,
however, has held that language contained in an employee handbook can create the right to
FMLA leave for workers of employers with less than the required number of employees. See
Thomas v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 251 F.3d 1132, 1137 (7th Cir. 2001).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (1994). The employee may take the twelve-week leave on an in-
termittent or reduced leave schedule in cases of the employee's own serious health condition or
taking care of a family member's serious health condition. § 2612(b)(1).
22. § 2611(11) ("The term 'serious health condition' means an illness, injury, impairment, or
physical or mental condition that involves (A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential
medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider.").
23. § 2612(e); 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(3) (1994). If leave is foreseeable, the FMLA requires em-
ployees to notify employers of the need within thirty days before the date of leave, and to make a
reasonable effort to schedule the treatment so as not to disrupt to operations of the employer.
§ 2612(e). Employers may require certification from a health care provider of the employee's or
relative's serious health condition. § 2614(c)(3). Many criticize the statute's stringent standard of
"serious health condition," noting that many pressing childhood or elderly needs that legiti-
mately call employees away from their jobs do not constitute "serious health conditions." E.g.,
Duarte, supra note 16, at 852.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (1994).
25. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(a) (2000) ("Every employer covered by the FMLA is re-
quired to post and keep posted on its premises, in conspicuous places where employees are em-
ployed, whether or not it has any "eligible" employees, a notice explaining the Act's provisions
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section, the DOL regulations impose further employer notice re-
quirements, which give rise to the issue addressed in this Note. 26
The FMLA mandates only unpaid leave,27 but encourages
employers to adopt more generous policies than those mandated by
the Act. 28 In many cases, the FMLA will converge with employers'
own policies allowing paid leave, such as vacation days, sick days,
and disability pay. The FMLA allows employers the option of re-
quiring employees to substitute their paid leave for any part of the
FMLA leave entitlement. 29 In other words, paid leave entitlements
may run concurrently with FMLA leave. The FMLA does not re-
quire employers to expand leave policies beyond a total of twelve
weeks. 30 The DOL regulations attempt to address the confusion and
complexity an employer faces in tracking FMLA entitlements at the
same time as tracking its own benefit program. 31
At the end of the mandated leave, the FMLA imposes both
an affirmative and a negative obligation on employers. As an af-
firmative duty, the employer must restore the employee to the same
and providing information concerning the procedures for filing complaints of violations of the Act
with the Wage and Hour Division. The notice must be posted prominently where it can be readily
seen by employees and applicants for employment. Employers may duplicate the text of the
notice contained in Appendix C of this part, or copies of the required notice may be obtained from
local offices of the Wage and Hour Division. The poster and the text must be large enough to be
easily read and contain fully legible text."); 29 C.F.R. § 825 app. C (2000) (sample posting notice,
including reasons for taking leave, employee notice requirements, imlawful acts by employers,
and job protections).
26. See infra Part II.C.
27. § 2612(c). Only mandating unpaid leave often surfaces as one of the biggest criticisms of
the current FMLA. See Duarte, supra note 16, at 848-52 (arguing that the FMLA only benefits
women who are employed, who have abundant financial resources and who have generous insur-
ance packages and that families "whose sheer survival depends on federally legislated assis-
tance" therefore cannot take advantage of the FMLA's protections).
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 2653 (1994) ("Nothing in this Act ... shall be construed to discourage
employers from adopting or retaining leave policies more generous than any policies that comply
with the requirements under this Act . . . ."). Employers do not, however, have to "provide paid
sick leave or paid medical leave in any situation in which such employer would not normally
provide any such paid leave." § 2612(d)(2)(B). For example, "[ilf an employer's paid sick leave
plan does not permit use of that leave to care for an ill family member, . . . the FMLA will not
require that leave associated with the family member's care be paid." Rigler, supra note 12, at
478.
29. § 2612(d)(2). An employer does not have to provide this option. In the absence of this op-
tion, an employee may elect to substitute paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave. Id.
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 2652(a) (1994). In addition, more generous state family leave laws will
also run concurrently with FMLA leave. Rigler, supra note 12, at 494-95. The FMLA preempts
less generous state family leave laws. Id.
31. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c)-(d) (2000) (requiring employers to notify employees when any
leave qualifies as FMLA leave).
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or an equivalent position upon returning to work. 32 As a negative
prohibition, employers may neither interfere with nor discriminate
on the basis of any of the rights provided in the FMLA.3 3 An em-
ployee or the Secretary of Labor may bring a civil suit for violation
of any of these obligations. 34
Congress provided multiple remedies for a violation of the
FMLA. The legislation provides legal remedies such as lost wages,
salary, employment benefits, or other compensation. 35 The employer
may also be liable for other economic losses sustained by the em-
ployee, such as out-of-pocket medical expenses. 36 Furthermore, em-
ployers who violate FMLA rights are liable to the employee for liq-
uidated damages, equal to the sum of the two types of damages de-
scribed above, plus interest. 37 Finally, employees may also receive
equitable relief, including employment, reinstatement, or promo-
tion, in addition to attorneys' fees and costs. 38
C. Regulatory Provisions
Section 2654 of the FMLA in the U.S. Code charges the Sec-
retary of Labor with the duty of prescribing regulations "as are nec-
essary to carry out" the provisions of the FMLA. 39 The regulations,
which took effect in 1995, attempt to fill in gaps left by Congress
and establish more detailed procedures for employees and employ-
, 32. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1) (1994). The employer must also maintain the employees' accrued
benefits, including group health insurance plans. § 2614(a)(2), (c).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)-(b) (1994).
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) (1994) (authorizing a private right of action); § 2617(b)(2) (au-
thorizing action by Secretary). The courts recognize two kinds of claims under the FMLA. E.g.,
O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2000). "Interference
claims" arise when employers burden or completely deny substantive statutory rights to which
their employees are entitled. Id. (citing § 2615(a)(1)). "Retaliation claims" arise when employers
discharge employees for exercising their statutory right to leave. Id. (citing § 2615(a)(2)); see also
Michael Murphy, Note, The Federal Courts' Struggle with Burden Allocation for Reinstatement
Claims Under the Family & Medical Leave Act: Breakdown of the Rigid Dual Framework, 50
CATH. U. L. REV. 1081, 1084-85 (2001) (detailing the confusion in the courts over the proper
analytical framework for reinstatement claims, which involve both an interference component
and an element of retaliation). While plaintiffs often assert both claims at once, the problems
described in this Note will occur in interference claims since the plaintiffs allege that proper
notification is a substantive right provided to them by the FMLA.
35. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I); Megan E. Blomquist, Note & Comment, A Shield, Not a Sword: In-
voluntary Leave Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 76 WASH. L. REV. 509, 517 (2001)
(describing damage provisions).
36. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(II).
37. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii). To overcome the presumption of liquidated damages, the employer
must prove that it acted in good faith and with reasonable grounds for believing it was not in
violation of the FMLA. Id.
38. § 2617(a)(1)(B),(3).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (1994).
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ers to effectuate FMLA requirements. 40 For example, the DOL regu-
lations establish a six-part test for defining a "serious health condi-
tion,"41 a noticeably vague definition in the statute.
Most significant for purposes of this Note, the DOL regula-
tions elaborate upon employer and employee notice requirements. 42
In effect, the regulatory scheme places most of the burden for un-
derstanding and discharging FMLA obligations upon the employer.
While the issue may seem trivial at first, a mistake in notification
has major ramifications for both parties,and significantly penalizes
the party bearing the burden of understanding the FMLA. As this
Note will argue, Congress, not the DOL, should make the policy de-
cision of where to place the heavier burden of notification.
To illustrate how a heavier burden is placed on the employer,
the FMLA requires employees taking foreseeable leave to provide
thirty days notice to the employer, 43 but the regulations allow em-
ployees to notify employers of a need for unforeseeable leave "as
soon as practicable."44 The employee, or a spokesperson,45 need not
even mention the FMLA by name, but only needs to state that leave
is needed. 46 The burden then shifts to the employer to obtain any
additional information needed to determine the applicability of the
FMLA. 47 The employee must comply with any information requests
as quickly and comprehensively as practicable, "taking into consid-
eration the exigencies of the situation."48
Without proper notice from the employee, the employer can
delay the requested leave. 49 In reality, the broad "as soon as practi-
cable" language will almost never allow an employer to deny (quali-
40. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.100.00 (2000) (describing, in question and answer format, detailed
procedures to comply with the broad statutory scheme).
41. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (2000). The FMLA itself provides a vague explanation as to what
constitutes a serious health condition. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C)-(D) (1994). Under the regu-
lations, however, a serious health condition is either inpatient care or continuing treatment by a
health care provider. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114. The regulations provide a combination of factors that
define "continuing treatment." See id.
42. 29 C.F.R. § 825.300.312 (2000).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1)-(2) (1994).
44. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a) (2000).
45. Notice may be given by the employee's spokesperson, such as a spouse or adult family
member, if the employee is unable to do so personally. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a); see also Timothy Stewart Bland, The Required Content of Em-
ployees' Notice to Employers of the Need for Leave Under the FMLA, 12 LAB. LAW. 235, 246 (1996)
(advising employers to be "flexible and generous" when evaluating employee leave requests since
employers face considerable uncertainty in determining whether to make further inquiry).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b).
48. Id.
49. 29 C.F.R. § 825.304(b) (2000).
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fying) leave in exigent circumstances. 50 This language seems to rec-
ognize that, in emergency situations, providing the proper informa-
tion to an employer may not be the first priority for an employee.
Therefore, the regulation once again places more of a burden on the
employer to discharge FMLA rights because the employer must
wait for the employee to clarify his situation before determining
whether the FMLA applies at all.
The DOL regulations, however, impose significant notice re-
quirements on employers in addition to the posting requirement
contained in the text of the FMLA. 51 For example, employers must
include FMLA information in employee handbooks.5 2 Furthermore,
employers must provide written notice detailing specific expecta-
tions and obligations each time an employee requests leave. 53 This
written notice must include information concerning issues such as
medical certification requirements, substitution of paid leave, em-
ployee responsibility for health benefit premium payments, and the
employee's right to restoration to the same or an equivalent job
upon return from leave.54
A related regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d), requires em-
ployers to inform employees whether they meet the eligibility test
for FMLA protection. 55 If the employer fails to advise the employee
whether he or she is eligible for FMLA leave prior to the date the
requested leave is to commence, the employee will be deemed eligi-
ble. 56 In this case, the employer may not deny the leave, even
though the employee may not even be legally entitled to FMLA pro-
tection.5 7
50. For example, in McNeela v. United Air Lines, Inc., the court held the notice regulation
was satisfied when an employer knew that an employee had sustained a work-related accident
with a serious neck injury. No. 98 C 1433, 1999 WL 377831, at *5 (N.D. ll. May 10, 1999). Even
though the employee repeatedly refused to return the employer's phone calls, the court ruled
that refusal to provide more information did not affect any ruling on the notice requirement. See
id. at *6. The court, instead, instructed employers to require a medical certification to resolve
problems of uncommunicative employees and gain more information on the seriousness of the
employee's condition. See id.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (1994).
52. 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(a)(1) (2000).
53. 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(b)(1).
54. Id.
55. 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) (2000). An "eligible employee" is an employee of a covered em-
ployer who has been employed by the employer for at least twelve months and has worked at
least 1250 hours of service during the twelve-month period immediately preceding the com-
mencement of the leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(a)(1)-(2). The employer must confirm whether or not
the employee has worked the requisite twelve months and 1250 hours. 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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The regulation at issue in this Note, 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c),
utilizes a similar approach to that used in 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d).
Section 825.208(c) requires employers to notify employees when
leave will count against the employee's annual FMLA leave enti-
tlement, thus "designating" the leave as FMLA leave. 58 Problems
under this regulation arise when employers begin substituting paid
leave for FMLA leave, allowing the employer's more generous leave
programs to run concurrently with their FMLA obligations. 59 In
such cases, it may be unclear whether the employer-provided leave
also counts as FMLA leave. To solve the problem, 29 C.F.R. §
825.208(c) mandates that employer designation of paid leave as
FMLA leave must occur before the leave commences, unless the
employer does not have sufficient information to make the FMLA
designation.60 Significantly, if the employer does not notify the em-
ployee that paid leave also counts as FMLA leave, the absence pre-
ceding the notice to the employee of the designation does not count
toward the employee's twelve-week FMLA leave entitlement. 61
D. The Incongruity Between the FMLA and the Regulations: An
Illustration
The following hypothetical situation helps clarify the ab-
stract rules of the DOL regulations. Suppose Jane works for Acme
Inc., a company that provides employees with two weeks of paid
vacation time and one week of paid sick days. Jane has accrued all
three weeks of this paid leave time. As the FMLA permits, 62 Acme
requires that employees substitute accrued vacation and sick days
for unpaid FMLA leave.
When Jane decides to take maternity leave, she properly no-
tifies Acme within thirty days of her intended leave. Acme must
then notify Jane, in writing, that her accrued three weeks paid
leave will run concurrently with her twelve weeks unpaid FMLA
leave. 63 Jane will then receive twelve total weeks of leave, as man-
58. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) (2000).
59. Requiring substitution, as mentioned above, is merely an option for employers. If an
employer does not require substitution, the employee may also elect to substitute paid leave for
unpaid leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2) (1994).
60. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c). For instance, the employer may not have sufficient information
to designate leave as FMLA leave when the employee has failed to comply with the employee's
notice requirements due to exigent circumstances.
61. Id.
62. § 2612(d)(2)(B).
63. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c).
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dated by the statute, but three of those weeks will be paid as em-
ployer-provided leave.
Suppose, however, that Acme fails to notify Jane properly
that her paid leave runs concurrently with unpaid FMLA leave un-
til the twelfth week of her leave. Jane may be under the impression
that she not only receives her accrued paid leave, but also another
twelve weeks of unpaid leave mandated by the FMLA, for a total of
fifteen weeks leave. She might not know that she was expected to
return to work after twelve weeks in order to retain her FMLA
right to reinstatement. Under the current regulations, those twelve
weeks preceding proper notice would not count toward Jane's
FMLA entitlement; 64 only a proper notification triggers the running
of the twelve-week clock. Thus, under 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c), Acme
must then allow Jane an additional twelve weeks of leave, for a to-
tal of twenty-four weeks.6 5 After twenty-four weeks, Acme must re-
store Jane to her original, or an equivalent, position.6
This incongruity has disturbed some courts, which have ac-
curately noted that the FMLA intended to provide only twelve
weeks of leave per year. 67 The question thus becomes one of statu-
tory construction and administrative law to determine whether
Congress could have possibly intended the interpretation espoused
by the DOL. 68
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1) (1994) (providing a right to restoration).
67. E.g., Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 938 (8th Cir. 2000) ("Entirely
absent from the text of the FMLA is any indication that the FMLA was designed to entitle an
employee to additional leave under the FMLA when the employer's leave plan already provides
for twelve weeks of FMLA qualifying leave."), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2548 (2001) (mem.); Cox v.
AutoZone, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1369, 1373 (M.D. Ala. 1998) ("Plaintiff is, in effect, converting
FMLA from a statute which provides a minimum, a baseline, of federally-mandated unpaid
leave, into a statute which mandates an additional [twelve] weeks of leave for all employees ....
This is inconsistent with the text and the guarantees of the statute.").
68. Ragsdale, 218 F.3d at 936 ("In all cases, although the level of deference afforded an
agency interpretation may appear high, the court remains the final authority in matters of statu-
tory interpretation and 'must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent.' ").
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III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. "Congress Was Clear"." Cases Invalidating 29 C.F.R. §
825.208(c)69
1. McGregor v. AutoZone, Inc.: The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit was the first circuit court to address
the validity of 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c). The Middle District of Ala-
bama had already expressed judicial scorn for the effects of this
regulation in holding it invalid, and in 1998, the Eleventh Circuit
strongly affirmed that holding. 70
In McGregor v. AutoZone, Inc., plaintiff Alicia Cox, 71 worked
as a manager in the defendant's AutoZone store for over three
years. 72 Cox commenced maternity leave under AutoZone's disabil-
ity pay plan, which provided managers with full salary for thirteen
weeks of disability. 73 Cox alleged that AutoZone never informed her
that this paid leave would run concurrently with her FMLA-
mandated leave.74 Cox did not return to work until after fifteen
weeks of maternity leave. 75 Upon her return, AutoZone demoted her
for exceeding both her employer-provided the twelve weeks of
FMLA-protected leave. 76 Cox claimed that her employer-provided
leave should run consecutively with her FMLA leave due to im-
69. Agreeing with the reasoning of McGregor and Ragsdale, detailed below, many district
courts have followed suit in invalidating 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c). See, e.g., Fulham v. HSBC Bank
USA, No. 99 Civ. 11054 (JGK), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13570 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2001); Howell v.
Standard Motor Prods., Inc., No. 4:99-CV-987-E, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12332, at *9-10 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 10, 2001); Daley v. WellPoint Health Networks, Inc., No. Civ.A. 99-CV-11464RGS,
2001 WL 539463, at *5 (D. Mass. May 14, 2001); Twyman v. Dilks, No. 99-4378, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12942, at *33 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 6, 2000); Schloer v. Lucent Tech. Inc., No. 99-3392, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10146, at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 21, 2000); Neal v. Children's Habilitation Ctr., No. 97
C 7711, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14762, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 1999).
70. See Cox v. AutoZone, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1369, 1371 (M.D. Ala. 1998), aff'd, McGregor v.
AutoZone, Inc. 180 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 1999).
71. At the appellate court level, the trustee for Cox's bankruptcy, McGregor, was substi-
tuted as the real party in interest. McGregor, 180 F.3d at 1306 n.1.
72. See Cox, 990 F. Supp. at 1371.
73. Id. The employer's leave policy was thus more generous than that required by the
FMLA.
74. Id. AutoZone contended that the employee handbook specified that leave taken with
disability pay ran concurrently with FMLA leave. Id. The court never resolved this factual dis-
pute, since it invalidated the notice provision.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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proper notice under 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c), and brought suit for lost
wages and benefits, liquidated damages, and reinstatement. 7
In granting summary judgment for AutoZone, the district
court emphasized that the FMLA no longer protected Cox because
Cox had taken the full twelve weeks of leave authorized in the stat-
ute.78 This same logic has been used in other cases reasoning that a
plaintiff may not sue under the FMLA if the plaintiff had received
the substantive rights (the twelve weeks leave) offered under the
FMLA. 79 The Cox opinion did not rest on this reasoning, however; it
held 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) invalid under the Chevron test.80
In the unanimous Chevron decision, the Supreme Court es-
tablished a two-step test applicable to judicial review of agency in-
terpretations of agency-administered statutes.8 ' In reviewing a
regulation, the court must first examine whether Congress has di-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue.8 2 If the intent of Con-
gress is clear, the inquiry ends and the court must give effect to the
congressional intent.8 3 If, however, the statute is silent or ambigu-
ous with respect to the specific issue, the court must decide whether
the agency's interpretation is based upon a reasonable construction
of the statute.84 If so, the court must defer to the agency interpreta-
tion and uphold the regulation.8 5
The district court opinion seemed to suggest that this regula-
tion failed step one of the Chevron test, reasoning that Congress
had spoken directly to the precise question at issue.8 6 By examining
the legislative history of the FMLA, the district court found a "clear
intent of Congress to protect only those workers who take twelve or
77. Id. at 1370-71.
78. Id. at 1373.
79. E.g., Kur v. Fox Valley Press, Inc., No. 96 C 3685, 1997 WL 89140, at *3-4 (N.D. fll. Feb.
20, 1997) ("FMLA allows 12 weeks of leave.... We take judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff's
first leave period was 12 weeks in length. Therefore, [the plaintiff] did not have a FMLA right to
the second leave period. Any harassment that resulted from her plans to take a second leave is
not actionable under the FMLA.").
80. Cox, 990 F. Supp. at 1381; McGregor v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir.
1999).
81. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. The Chevron test advocates strong deference to agency interpretations. Id. at 844. "If
this choice [in policy] represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were
committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the
statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have
sanctioned." Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).
86. See Cox v. AutoZone, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1369, 1376 (M.D. Ala. 1998) ("There is not
enough ambiguity in FMLA to justify the regulations which the Secretary has written.").
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fewer weeks of leave.""' Therefore, as to the amount of leave, Con-
gress did not leave a "gap" for the DOL to fill.88 The district court
also noted, however, that this regulation would fail the second step
of Chevron, even if Congress had left an ambiguity, because the
regulation is "manifestly contrary to the statute."8 9
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit began its inquiry by examin-
ing the statutory language and legislative history of the FMLA to
discern congressional intent on this issue. 90 The court found that
Congress intended to provide only a baseline of twelve weeks leave
and that Congress nowhere suggested that the twelve-week enti-
tlement might be extended.9 1 In fact, the court pointed out, where
Congress wanted explicit notice provisions with significant conse-
quences, Congress provided for them in the statutory language.9 2
The Eleventh Circuit also found the regulation inconsistent
with the purpose of the FMLA. The FMLA explicitly aims "to bal-
ance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families ... in
a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employ-
ers."9 3 Section 825.208(c), the court reasoned, did not accommodate
the employers' interests because the employer might provide all
twelve weeks of FMLA leave and still find itself involved in litiga-
tion.94 Furthermore, the court found that this regulation discour-
aged employers from adopting leave policies more generous than
the FMLA minimum standards, which conflict with the FMLA pro-
vision expressly stating that the FMLA does not discourage more
generous leave policies. 95
2. Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc.: The Eighth Circuit
In 2000, one year after McGregor, the Eighth Circuit fol-
lowed the Eleventh Circuit in declaring 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) inva-
87. Id. at 1380.
88. Id. at 1381.
89. Id. at 1380-81.
90. McGregor v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 1305, 1308 (lth Cir. 1999).
91. See id.
92. Id. For example, the FMLA allows employers to deny restoration to "highly compen-
sated employees," but only when the employer properly notifies an employee of the intent to deny
restoration on that basis. See id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b) (1994)).
93. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3) (1994)).
94. Id.
95. See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2653 (1994) ("Nothing in this Act ... shall be construed to dis-
courage employers from adopting or retaining leave policies more generous that any policies that
comply with the requirements under this Act .... ")).
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lid.96 In Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., plaintiff Tracy
Ragsdale had requested and received seven months leave Under the
leave policy of Wolverine, her employer. 97 Wolverine never notified
Ragsdale that this leave counted against her FMLA entitlement,
and she remained away from work beyond the seven months.98 She
was subsequently terminated for exceeding her leave. 99 Ragsdale
protested by requesting twelve weeks FMLA leave because she
could not yet return to work. 100 Wolverine denied the request and
Ragsdale brought suit alleging improper notice under the DOL
regulations. 1 1 The Ragsdale court agreed with the reasoning set
forth in McGregor, holding that the DOL regulations improperly
converted the FMLA's minimum of twelve weeks leave into a man-
date of notice and interfered with Wolverine's more generous leave
policies. 10 2
The Ragsdale court provided additional reasoning beyond
that of McGregor that may explain why certain courts disapprove of
this DOL regulation. Both courts criticized the DOL's distortion of §
2612(d)(2)(B) of the FMLA under the U.S. Code, which provides
that the employee may choose, or the employer may require, the
substitution of paid leave for the FMLA entitlement. 0 3 The
Ragsdale court, like the Eleventh Circuit in McGregor, viewed this
section as an explicit balance between employer and employee
rights. 104 This section enables employees to take advantage of paid
employer-provided leave while protecting the employer from having
to extend more leave than permitted in its policy. 10 5
Where the Ragsdale court elaborated, however, was in its
recognition that the balance achieved by § 2612(d)(2)(B) of the
FMLA under the U.S. Code does not always require a notice provi-
sion, contrary to the DOL's interpretation. 10 6 In some cases, rea-
soned the court, an employer's failure to give notice would interfere
96. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 940 (8th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 2548 (2001) (mem.). This court invalidated 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a), which
merely repeats the notice provision in 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c). Id.
97. Id. at 935.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. Presumably, Ragsdale could not return to work because she had not recovered
sufficiently from her cancer treatments. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 937-38.
103. See id. at 938; Cox v. AutoZone, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1369, 1374 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
104. See Ragsdale, 218 F.3d at 938.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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with or deny an employee's substantive FMLA rights. 0 7 For exam-
ple, if the employer failed to give proper notice, and the employee
would have returned to work at the end of twelve weeks if properly
notified, there would be an interference with the employee's
rights. 08 As another example, improper notice in cases of antici-
pated leave would interfere with an employee's ability to plan and
use future FMLA leave. 10 9 In such cases, the employee could sue the
employer for lack of notice under the FMLA. 110
The Ragsdale case, the court concluded, did not qualify as
one in which improper notice interfered with Ragsdale's substantive
FMLA rights."' Ragsdale admitted that even if she had known that
she had exhausted her FMLA leave, she was not well enough to
have returned to work at the end of her seven-month leave. 112
Therefore, the court held, allowing Ragsdale to recover against
Wolverine for a "technical violation" would be "an egregious eleva-
tion of form over substance" because proper notice would not have
provided the employee with any more protection under these spe-
cific facts. 113 Even if Wolverine had provided proper notice of FMLA
designation, Ragsdale could not have changed her behavior, could
not have returned to work, and therefore, still would have lost her
job. 114 The court ruled that the breadth of the DOL regulations dis-
pensed with the balancing test favored by the FMLA, and created a
rigid rule that penalizes unwary employers.115
The Eighth Circuit, therefore, did not invalidate all notice
provisions the DOL might promulgate. 116 Rather, the court empha-
sized that a narrower notice regulation that tied the cause of action
to interference with substantive rights could survive a challenge in
the Eighth Circuit. 117 The Eleventh Circuit, in McGregor, failed to
include such a helpful caveat. The McGregor court did not consider
whether the plaintiff could have returned to work after her allotted
leave time. 118 In fact, since the plaintiff in McGregor took maternity
leave, it could be inferred that she could have returned to work had
107. Id. at 939.
108. Id. at 939-40.
109. Id. at 940.
110. Id. at 939-40.
111. Id. at 940.
112. See id. at 935.
113. Id. at 940.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 939.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See McGregor v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 1999).
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she known that she did not have an additional twelve weeks of
leave available after her paid leave ended. 119 Therefore, the Elev-
enth Circuit may have invalidated the notice provisions even if fail-
ure to give notice interfered with the employee's substantive rights.
Such an interpretation of McGregor's holding differs significantly
from the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Ragsdale in that McGregor could
potentially mean that notice of FMLA designation is never re-
quired, even when lack of notice would affect an employee's sub-
stantive rights. This Note does not advocate adopting this particu-
lar interpretation of the McGregor rule, however, because that rule
would, in many cases, directly conflict with the FMLA by encourag-
ing employers to interfere with employees' FMLA rights, as prohib-
ited by the statute. 120
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the Ragsdale case
and will hear arguments this Term.' 2 ' This Note advocates affirm-
ing the Eighth Circuit's ruling.
3. Nolan v. Hypercom Manufacturing Resources: The Policy
Argument
The District of Arizona joined with the Eighth and Eleventh
circuits in invalidating 29 C.F.R. § 825.208 with a well-reasoned
policy argument in Nolan v. Hypercom Manufacturing Resources.122
In Nolan, the plaintiff began a medical leave of absence in Novem-
ber, did not receive notice of FMLA designation until January of the
next year. 123 When the plaintiff returned to work in March, the
company had eliminated his position. 124 Whether the employer had
an obligation to reinstate the plaintiff depended upon when his
FMLA leave began, which in turn depended on the validity of the
prohibition against retroactive designation under 29 C.F.R. §
825.208(c). 125
The court in Nolan viewed the issue as "whether the em-
ployer or the employee bears the burden of figuring out the em-
ployment consequences" of a leave greater than twelve weeks. 126
While 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) provides a bright line rule, so that
119. See id.
120. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (1994) (prohibiting employer interference with the exercise of
employee FMLA rights).
121. See Ragsdale, 218 F.3d at 933, cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2548 (2001) (mem.).
122. No. CIV 00-802-PHX-RCB, 2001 WL 378235, at *6-7 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 2001).
123. Id. at *1.
124. Id.
125. See id. at *3.
126. Id. at *6.
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both sides understand that FMLA leave begins only after proper
notice, the court reasoned that the rule did not speak to the reason-
able expectations that the FMLA gives to employers and employees
in general. 127 Recognizing that the FMLA represents a balance be-
tween employers and employees, the court emphasized that the
FMLA actually puts some of the responsibility for calculating
FMLA leave on the employee. 128
Therefore, the court held that the regulation was invalid be-
cause it had "the perverse effect of creating a game, such that em-
ployees gamble on the amount of leave they might obtain outside
the twelve weeks provided by the FMLA."1 29 While the court did not
explain in detail the "game" that the regulation creates, one can
assume the court envisions employees staying out on leave indefi-
nitely until they have received proper notice of FMLA designation.
The court seemed to be saying that a scenario in which an employee
returns to work when ready and able, instead of when forced to re-
turn, better effectuates the vision of Congress in enacting the
FMLA. The court found that the game created by the DOL regula-
tions upset the intended balance between employers' interests in
filling jobs and employees' need for medical leave. 30 Thus, the court
suggested that employees should assume more responsibility for
calculating their prescribed leave periods.' 3'
B. "Congress Left Gaps": Cases Upholding 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c)
1. Plant v. Morton International, Inc.: The Sixth Circuit
In Plant v. Morton International, Inc., The Sixth Circuit ex-
pressly disagreed with the position above, and upheld 29 C.F.R. §
825.208(c) under the Chevron test. 3 2 The plaintiff Plant had in-
127. Id.
128. See id. at *7 ("There is no reason why employees should not be required to understand
the extent of their guaranteed leave."). For example, employees have a duty to notify employers
of foreseeable births and planned medical treatments. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e) (1994)). The
court also noted that the employee is in a much better position to anticipate leaves that will last
longer than twelve weeks. See id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 212 F.3d 929, 936 (6th Cir. 2000). In addition, the Ninth Circuit applied 29 C.F.R. §
825.208(c) without discussion of its validity in Rowe v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 244 F.3d 1115,
1118-19 (9th Cir. 2001). In Rowe, the plaintiff, a salaried employee, sued for overtime pay under
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), claiming that since her employer paid her by the hour
while she worked part-time due to an ankle injury, she was classified as "exempt" under the
278 [Vol. 55:261
FMLA AND THE CHEVRON TEST
jured his back at work and received both a leave of absence and ac-
commodations for his disability upon return to work. 33 After later
aggravating his injury, Plant took another leave of absence without
following any FMLA or employer-created procedures to request
leave.' 3 4 Citing poor performance on unrelated matters, Plant's em-
ployer, Morton, terminated Plant six weeks into his leave of ab-
sence. 135 Plant claimed that his termination was the result of dis-
crimination for taking leave and brought suit under the FMLA. 136
Plant admitted that he would not have been able to return to work
within twelve weeks, but argued that his FMLA leave entitlement
never began to run since Morton never notified him that it desig-
nated his leave as FMLA leave. 137 Therefore, Plant argued that he
should have had additional leave time beyond twelve weeks.138
The Sixth Circuit held that 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) was valid
and applicable in this case. 139 Applying the Chevron test, the court
first noted the FMLA's silence as to the notice an employer must
give an employee before designating paid leave as FMLA leave. 140
The court then held that 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) evinced a reason-
able understanding of the FMLA, reflecting Congress's concern with
providing ample notice to employees of their rights under the Act.' 4'
Furthermore, the Plant court ruled that allowing more than twelve
weeks leave in some circumstances did not manifestly contradict
Congress's intent to mandate a minimum of twelve weeks leave. 142
The court emphasized the word "minimum" in justifying and ap-
proving of the possibility that an employee may receive more than
twelve weeks of leave, especially since this regulation would only
provide more than twelve weeks leave upon "an employer's failure
to notify employees that the clock has started to run on their allot-
FLSA and entitled to overtime. Id. at 1117. The employer countered that it only paid her by the
hour because she worked a reduced schedule, pursuant to the FMLA, and therefore, she was not
classified as "exempt." Id. (citing § 2612(c) and 29 C.F.R. § 825.206(a), which provide that deduct-
ing salary for intermittent FMLA leave does not affect the exempt status of an employee). The
court, citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c), held the leave to be FMLA qualifying even though the em-
ployer had provided no notice to the employee of FMLA designation. Id. at 1118-19.
133. See Plant, 212 F.3d at 932.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 933.
137. Id. at 934.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 935.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 935-36.
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ted period of leave." 143 Accordingly, even though Plant would not
have been able to return to work after twelve weeks, his FMLA
claim survived summary judgment. 144 The court did not discuss
whether, upon remand, Plant's claim could prevail without a show-
ing that Morton interfered with his FMLA rights by failing to give
notice under 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c). 145
2. Lower Courts
Two district courts had previously upheld 29 C.F.R. §
825.208(c) under similar facts, but using more elaborate reasoning
than Plant.146 In Chan v. Loyola University Medical Center, the
plaintiff contended that her employer did not notify her until ap-
proximately twelve weeks into her leave that her paid sick leave
also counted toward her FMLA entitlement. 147 As a result, the
plaintiff alleged that she continued to request extensions of her
leave, thinking that her employer would still restore her position
upon her return to work. 148 Instead, her employer terminated her at
the end of her extended leave. 149
In applying the Chevron test, the Chan court first recognized
clear gaps in the FMLA. 150 One gap was regarding employee notice
of substitution of paid leave for FMLA leave; 151 the other gap con-
cerned the question of when FMLA leave begins. 152 Next, the court
noted that the FMLA authorized the DOL to prescribe such regula-
tions as are necessary to implement the FMLA. 15 3 Because the
143. Id.
144. Id. at 934, 936.
145. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 939-40 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding
that notice regulations that penalized an employer who failed to give proper notice of FMLA
designation, and thereby interfered with the employee's substantive FMLA rights, were valid),
cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 2548 (2001) (mem.).
146. See Ritchie v. Grand Casinos of Miss., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 878, 881 (S.D. Miss. 1999);
Chan v. Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 97 C 3170, 1999 WL 1080372, at *10 (N.D. 111. Nov. 23,
1999).
147. 1999 WL 1080372, at *3.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at *7.
151. Id. ("The FMLA provides that an employer or an employee may substitute paid leave for
unpaid leave, but it does not specify how or when an employer or employee must inform the
other that paid leave will be substituted for unpaid leave."); 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2) (1999) (dis-
cussing substitution of paid leave).
152. Chan, 1999 WL 1080372, at *7 ("The FMLA does not specify when the twelve weeks of
FMLA leave begin or how FMLA leave is initiated."); § 2612(a)(1) (establishing twelve-week
leave entitlement).
153. Chan, 1999 WL 1080372, at *8.
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FMLA left such gaps and delegated to the DOL the authority to fill
them in, the court, in accordance with Chevron, would only over-
turn regulations that were "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly con-
trary to the statute.'' 4
The Chan court held that the regulations did not rise to this
arbitrariness standard, and instead "reflected a reasonable accom-
modation of conflicting policies."15 5 The Chan court did not agree
with the McGregor opinion that 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) skewed the
intended FMLA balance in favor of employees at the expense of em-
ployer interests. 156 First, the court observed that employers could
easily avoid granting more than twelve weeks of leave by complying
with the "modest burden" of a flexible notice requirement. 15 7 More-
over, the Chan court considered the regulations to be valuable be-
cause they had the salutary effect of motivating employers to make
employees aware of their rights under the FMLA. 158 The court
found that the regulations helped to prevent misunderstandings,
such as that in Chan, where an employee erroneously believed her
job was safe and failed to return to work under circumstances
where it might have been possible. 5 9 This reasoning echoes the
Ragsdale court's caveat that notice regulations with severe conse-
quences make more sense when failure to give notice interferes
with an employee's substantive FMLA rights.160
Ritchie v. Grand Casinos of Mississippi, Inc. similarly upheld
29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) as a permissible construction of the FMLA. 161
The Ritchie court characterized the gap in the FMLA in a slightly
different manner, but its explanation is instructive. Acknowledging
that the FMLA provides only twelve weeks of leave, the court could
not ascertain from the statute what event "triggers" the twelve-
week period calculation. 16 2 Given this silence, the court held that
154. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984)).
155. Id. at *10 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845).
156. See id.
157. Id. at *9. The notice requirement is flexible because the employer may notify the em-
ployee orally or in writing. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(b)(2) (2000). Furthermore, if the employer cannot
ascertain whether leave is for an FMLA-qualifying reason, the employer may retroactively des-
ignate leave as FMLA leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c)-(d) (2000).
158. Chan, 1999 WL 1080372, at *9.
159. Id.
160. Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 938-40 (8th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 121 S.Ct. 2548 (2001) (mem.).
161. 49 F. Supp. 2d 878, 881 (S.D. Miss. 1999).
162. Id. ("For example, does the [twelve]-week entitlement begin when the employee first
takes leave related to an unforeseeable 'serious medical condition' or when the employer first
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the DOL acted within its statutory authority in promulgating 29
C.F.R. § 825.208(c) under the first step of the Chevron test. 16 3 With-
out discussion, the court in Ritchie further held that the regulation
was not "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the stat-
ute" under the second step of the Chevron test.164
IV. RESOLUTION WITHOUT REGARD TO THE CHEVRON TEST
The foregoing cases demonstrate the differing views of courts
on the purpose of notice requirements such as 29 C.F.R. §
825.208(c). The McGregor and Plant courts seemed to suggest that
29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) functions as a "punitive" measure, regardless
of interference with the plaintiffs substantive rights, to encourage
employers to give proper notice. On the other hand, the Ragsdale
and Chan courts clearly felt that failure to give notice, under some
circumstances, constitutes interference with FMLA rights, which
gives rise to a cause of action under § 2615(a) of the FMLA under
the U.S. Code. 165 These courts refused to punish employers without
proof of interference. 166 Cases where a lack of notice constituted "in-
terference," however, arose long before courts began questioning the
validity of 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c). 167
These "interference cases" utilize reasoning similar to that of
the Eighth Circuit in Ragsdale but they do not examine the validity
of 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) or summarily uphold the regulation. These
cases develop a rule that allows an employee to bring a cause of ac-
tion for failure to notify of FMLA designation only if failure to no-
tify caused the employee to forfeit substantive FMLA rights. 68 If
receives notice. Is the [twelve]-week entitlement period tolled during certification [from a health-
care professional], and if so, can FMLA leave be counted retroactively?").
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (1994) ("It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with,
restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this title.").
166. Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 938-40 (8th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 2548 (2001) (mem.); Chan v. Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 97 C 3170, 1999 WL
1080372, at *9 (N.D. 11. Nov. 23, 1999).
167. See Fry v. First Fid. Bancorp., No. 95-6019, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 875, *1 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 30, 1996).
168. In addition to the Fry and Mora cases, see Longstreth v. Copple, 189 F.R.D. 401, 405-06
(N.D. Iowa 1999), which allowed a plaintiffs case to proceed to the jury when plaintiff claimed
that the sole reason she exceeded her FMLA leave was due to her employer's failure to notify her
that her leave was designated as FMLA leave. Cf Wilson v. Lemington Home for the Aged, 159
F. Supp. 2d 186, 193-94 (W.D. Penn. 2001) (holding that employer violated the interference pro-
vision of the FMLA when it deemed an employee to have quit for failure to provide a medical
certification because employer had not provided employee with written notification detailing
specific FMLA expectations and obligations); Klaiber v. Rinaldi, No. 199CV00541, 2001 WL
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the employee could have returned to work at the end of the leave,
but did not do so in reliance on the employer's lack of notice, the
employee has a valid cause of action for interference. 1
69
For example, in Fry v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, a dis-
trict court held that an employee had an interference claim based
on failure to notify. 170 The plaintiff, Fry, began taking paid vacation
and disability leave, which allowed her a little over twelve weeks of
paid leave, in anticipation of the birth of her child.171 At the end of
this period, Fry requested an additional sixteen weeks of unpaid
leave. 172 The employer offered the sixteen-week unpaid leave as
"additional family leave," as detailed in the employer's employee
handbook and family leave application. 173
Upon returning to work after a total of approximately
twenty-eight weeks leave, Fry's employer did not reinstate her to
her former, or an equivalent, position, as required by the FMLA.
174
The employer argued that after Fry took twelve weeks of leave, the
employer was no longer obligated to grant her the substantive pro-
tections of the FMLA. 175 Although the employer claimed to have
sent Fry an explanation of its family leave policy, which stated that
the first twelve weeks of the sixteen-week unpaid leave counted as
FMLA leave, Fry denied receiving such notice. 176 As a result, Fry
claimed that her employer misled her into requesting the additional
823529, at *5-6 (M.D.N.C. June 20, 2001) (holding that plaintiffs cannot maintain claim of FMLA
violation without proof that plaintiffs suffered some sort of measurable injury as a result of viola-
tion).
169. If the employee is unable to return to work, obviously an interference claim will not
stand because the employer is not obligated to restore the position of an employee who is unable
to perform the essential functions of the position. 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b) (2000) ("If the employee
is unable to perform an essential function of the position because of a physical or mental condi-
tion, including the continuation of a serious health condition, the employee has no right to resto-
ration to another position under the FMLA.").
170. Fry, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 875, at *22. The facts in Fry occurred when interim regula-
tions to the FMLA were in effect, but the interim regulations were substantively the same as the
current regulations for purposes of notice discussions.
171. Id. at *34.
172. Id. at *4.
173. Id. at *2-3.
174. Id. at *4.
175. Id. at *8-9.
176. Id. at *4-5. Apparently, this particular employer did not require Fry to substitute her
paid leave as FMLA leave, an option granted by the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (1994) ("An eligible
employee may elect, or an employer may require the employee, to substitute any of the accrued
paid ... leave ... for leave provided under [the FMLA]." (emphasis added)). This employer did,
however, require Fry to substitute the first twelve weeks of the additional sixteen-week unpaid
leave as "FMILA leave." Fry, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 875, at *2-3. According to the DOL regula-
tions, this substitution triggers a notice requirement. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) (2000).
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leave offered by her employer in excess of the FMLA mandate. 17
Therefore, according to Fry, the employer interfered with the exer-
cise of Fry's FMLA right to reinstatement by causing her to forfeit
FMLA protection after twelve weeks of unpaid leave. 178
The court agreed that Fry did have a cause of action for in-
terference. 17 9 First, the court carefully noted that Fry did not claim
FMLA protection after sixteen weeks of leave. 80 Rather, the court
explained, Fry only claimed that the defendant's failure to explain
its leave policy led her to believe that the employer offered more
leave with guaranteed reinstatement than required by the
FMLA. 181 This understanding reflects the McGregor court's concern
that the notice regulation could allow employees FMLA protection
to continue after twelve weeks of leave, which conflicts with the ex-
plicit twelve-week minimum in the statutory language. 8 2 The Fry
court addressed this concern by clarifying that plaintiffs bringing
interference claims for lack of notice do not necessarily claim a
right to more than twelve weeks of leave. 8 3 These plaintiffs simply
assert the right to receive notice that they are using up their FMLA
entitlement, so they can choose whether to come back to work. 8 4
Second, the court refused to grant summary judgment. 8 5 The
court explicitly held that if an employer fails adequately to notify
its employees of the impact of its own family leave policies on
FMLA rights, such conduct can constitute interference with an em-
ployee's FMLA rights, if it causes an employee unwittingly to forfeit
the protection of the FMLA. 8 6 The court could not, however, deter-
177. Fry, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 875, at *10-11.
178. Id. at *11.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at *12.
182. See McGregor v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 1999).
183. See 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 875, at *11 ("Contrary to defendant's argument, we find
nothing in plaintiffs complaint or in the record which suggests that plaintiff claims that she was
absolutely entitled to the full protection of the FMLA after sixteen weeks of leave.").
184. Id. at *11-12 ("Rather, [plaintiff] contends that defendant's failure to fully and clearly
explain its FMLA policies led her to believe that her employer offered more leave with guaran-
teed reinstatement than is required by the FMLA, a policy which would certainly be consistent
with the statute.").
185. Id. at *21-22.
186. Id. at *12-13; see also Dirham v. Van Wert County Hosp., No. 3:99cv07485, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6417, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2000) (denying employer's motion to dismiss when
employee claimed that she exceeded her FMLA leave because she did not know that she was
using her FMLA leave).
FMLA AND THE CHEVRON TEST
mine as a matter of law whether this employer's notice did indeed
mislead the employee. 187
Similarly, the plaintiff in Mora v. Chem-tronics, Inc. did not
receive all of the notice required by the FMLA and DOL regula-
tions. 188 As a result, Mora took extensive intermittent leave to care
for his seriously ill son, without properly notifying his employer of
the need for leave.189 Mora brought suit against his employer after
being terminated for excessive absences. 190 T ae court allowed
Mora's case to proceed to trial so that a jury coulid assess whether
the employer's inadequate notice caused Mora to forfeit any FMLA
rights. 191
Agreeing with Fry, the Mora court viewed this case as an in-
terference claim for lack of notice. 192 First, the court emphasized
that the "point of having a notice requirement is to ensure that an
employee understands his or her rights and does not forfeit them
unwittingly." 193 Therefore, the court reasoned, an interpretation of
the FMLA that allows employees to recover for notice violations
when the employee was adequately informed by other means would
make the FMLA "unnecessarily harsh." 94 Following on that obser-
vation, the Mora court pointed out that one violation of merely one
of the notice requirements in the FMLA or DOL regulations would
not automatically give rise to an interference claim. 95 Instead, the
court reviewed the adequacy of all of the notices utilized by the em-
ployer to assess whether Mora truly understood his rights and re-
sponsibilities under the FMLA. 196
Further, the court assessed whether Mora's understanding
(or misunderstanding) of his FMLA rights caused him to forfeit any
rights. 197 In this case, the court found that the jury could find two
187. See Fry, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 875, at *17. At the time of publication, research did not
reveal that the Fry case ever resulted in an opinion on the merits after this disposition.
188. See Mora v. Chem-tronics, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1227 (S.D. Cal. 1998). The court
catalogued the employer's notice deficiencies, including failure to hang a poster listing FMLA
rights, failure to provide a detailed written description of FMLA rights and responsibilities upon
an employee's request for leave, failure to include sufficient information in the employee manual,
and failure to educate human resource employees fully to respond to employee questions regard-
ing the FMLA. See id. at 1220-27.
189. See id. at 1199.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 1234.
192. See id. at 1220.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 1220-28.
197. See id. at 1227.
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possible interferences with Mora's rights.198 First, lack of notice
might have prevented Mora from using accrued vacation or sick
time to care for his son, the use of which would not have counted as
absences and led to his termination. 199 Second, Mora alleged that
lack of notice caused him to not satisfy his own notice requirement
under the FMLA, which presumably would have triggered his em-
ployer to provide more detailed information regarding his FMLA
rights and responsibilities. 200
One district court, ruling against an employee in an interfer-
ence case, listed some additional situations where lack of notice
would constitute interference with FMLA rights. 201 These situations
mirror the caveat in Ragsdale, in which the Eighth Circuit found
that certain notice regulations could pass the Chevron test when
the plaintiff could prove interference. 20 2 For example, this court
wrote that if an employee's need for leave was anticipated or if the
employee needed leave to care for a family member, lack of notice
would interfere with the employee's ability to schedule this leave
for holidays or other periods of time that would not count as ab-
sences. 20 3 Furthermore, the employee caring for a family member
could arrange for other people to care for the relative if the em-
ployee knew the amount of FMLA leave already used.20 4 Finally,
where an employee needs less than twelve weeks of leave, lack of
notice could interfere with the management of future leave by caus-
ing the employee unwittingly to use more time than necessary for
the present leave.20 5
More often, courts hold that a particular case of failure to
notify does not constitute interference with FMLA rights. Cases
holding that the employee suffered no "interference" usually follow
one of two fact patterns that lack a causal connection between the
lack of notice and the employee's decisions regarding leave. The
first occurs when the employee could not return to work at the end
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1227-28.
200. Id. at 1227. Because of genuine issues of fact, the court did not rule on these causal con-
nections as a matter of law. Id. at 1228.
201. See Donnellan v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., No. 98 Civ. 1096, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11103, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1999) (holding that lack of notice in this case did not interfere
with the plaintiffs rights because she could not return to work at the end of twelve weeks any-
way; and, therefore, 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) did not apply to the present situation); see also
Holmes v. e.spire Communications, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 657, 665-66 (D. Md. 2001) (same).
202. See 218 F.3d 933, 939-40 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2548 (2001) (mem.).
203. See Donnellan, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11103, at *14.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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of the leave, and therefore, did not forfeit substantive FMLA
rights.20 6 In other words, even if the employer had complied with a
notice regulation, the employee's behavior and leave schedule would
not have changed. As a result, the employee received full protection
under the FMLA by receiving twelve weeks leave and the employer
would no longer have FMLA obligations toward that employee, such
as reinstatement, after twelve weeks.
The second situation occurs when the employee knew of
FMLA rights despite the employer's failure to notify under one of
the DOL regulations, and therefore, did not rely on the (violated)
notice requirement to exercise substantive FMLA rights. 207 For ex-
ample, the district court in Voorhees v. Time Warner Cable National
Division granted summary judgment for the employer when, de-
spite a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether an em-
ployee received notice under 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c), the employee
testified that she understood that her leave of absence counted as
FMLA leave.208
A few of these interference cases uphold 29 C.F.R. §
825.208(c) as a valid interpretation of the FMLA. For example, the
court in Longstreth v. Copple, similar to the Eighth Circuit in
Ragsdale, narrowly construed McGregor.2 9 The Longstreth court
distinguished the present case from McGregor in that the plaintiff
in McGregor never stated that she would have returned to work
within twelve weeks if she had known her leave was designated as
FMLA leave. 210  Furthermore, the court narrowly construed
McGregor to invalidate only those portions of 29 C.F.R. § 825.208
that convert the minimum mandate of unpaid leave into an enti-
206. E.g., Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 1999);
Donnellan, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11103, at *13; Santos v. Shields Health Group, 996 F. Supp.
87, 93-94 (D. Mass. 1998); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b) (2000) ("If the employee is unable to
perform an essential function of the position because of a physical or mental condition, including
the continuation of a serious health condition, the employee has no right to restoration to an-
other position under the FMLA.").
207. See, e.g., Mora v. Chem-tronics, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1220 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (holding
that violation of one notice requirement does not automatically give rise to an interference
claim); Voorhees v. Time Warner Cable Nat'l Div., No. 98-1460, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227, at
*26 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1999); cf. Howell v. Standard Motor Prods., Inc., No. 4:99-CV-987-E, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12332, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2001) (holding that where employee hand-
book clearly stated that FMLA leave is the only leave policy in place, there is no need for em-
ployer to notify employee of FMLA designation because the leave could not have been anything
else).
208. See Voorhees, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227, at *24-27.
209. Longstreth v. Copple, 189 F.R.D. 401, 404 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
210. Id. In an affidavit, the plaintiff in Longstreth stated that had she been notified that her
leave was designated as FMLA leave, she would have returned to work at the end of the twelve
weeks. Id.
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tlement to an additional twelve weeks unless the employer notifies
the employee that he or she was using FMLA leave. 211 The
Longstreth court apparently interpreted McGregor in a manner
similar to the Ragsdale court's reasoning, stating that violation of
the notice provisions would not result in a cause of action unless
the violation interfered with the employee's substantive rights. 212
Most significantly, the Fry court premised its analysis of the
notice regulations on the understanding that violation of regula-
tions promulgated under a statute gives rise to a cause of action
under the statute itself.213 Without mentioning the Chevron test,
the Fry court cited a case that held that " 'substantive agency' regu-
lations have the force of law if authorized by Congress and promul-
gated to implement a statute."214 Since section 2654 of the FMLA
clearly directed the Secretary of Labor to prescribe regulations nec-
essary to implement the statute, the court concluded that the notice
regulation in the DOL regulations was substantive in nature and
therefore gave rise to a cause of action for interference with FMLA
rights.215 The court did not engage in any further discussion of the
DOL's authority to prescribe this particular regulation and seemed
to accept the regulation as valid.
Donnellan v. New York City Transit Authority, a later case
discussing interference and the validity of 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c),
also upheld the regulation. 216 The Secretary of Labor submitted an
amicus brief in that case arguing that the agency interpretation of
the regulation did not redefine or expand the substantive rights of
the statute (as the McGregor court accused the agency of doing), but
only addressed the aspect of notice. 217 The Donnellan court gave the
Secretary's interpretation controlling weight unless "plainly erro-
neous or inconsistent with the regulation," even though the inter-
pretation was advanced in legal briefs to the court. 218 Since the
court read the notice regulation as requiring additional leave only
when the lack of notice interfered with the plaintiffs rights, the
211. Id.
212. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 939-40 (8th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 121 S.Ct. 2548 (2001) (mem.).
213. See No. 95-6019, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 875, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 1996).
214. Id. (citing United States v. Walter Dunlap & Sons, Inc., 800 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir.
1986)).
215. Id. at *9-10.
216. See No. 98 Civ. 1096, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11103, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1999).
217. Id.
218. Id. at *13 n.9 (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) and
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462-63 (1997)).
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regulation did not contradict the statute, and the court deferred to
the Secretary's interpretation. 219
The Middle District of Pennsylvania, in Gadinski v. Shamo-
kin Community Hospital, expressly held 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c)
valid in the specific situation where lack of notice might have inter-
fered with the plaintiffs FMLA rights, 220 as the Ragsdale court en-
dorsed. In Gadinski, the employer agreed to give the plaintiff six
months maternity leave. 221 The plaintiff took the six months mater-
nity leave, but returned to find no work available in her position. 222
The employer argued that since the company provided the plaintiff
with more than twelve weeks of leave, the employer had satisfied
the FMLA.223 The court disagreed, reminding the employer that the
FMLA obligation included not only twelve weeks of leave, but also
required reinstatement of the employee after the protected leave. 224
The court distinguished Ragsdale and McGregor, which held
29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) invalid, finding that in those cases the plain-
tiffs took more leave than the employer offered, and thus, the
FMLA did not require the employer to reinstate those plaintiffs. 225
In Gadinski, however, the plaintiff complied with the agreed upon
length of leave, so the court held that the employer should have
kept her position open.226
While the court did not explicitly mention interference with
FMLA rights, the Gadinski ruling accords with other courts' rulings
holding employers liable for failing to provide notice and interfering
with plaintiffs' rights. The court implied that since the employer
agreed to allow six months leave, the employer led the plaintiff to
believe she retained all FMLA rights, even though she took more
than the prescribed twelve weeks of leave. One might assume that
if the plaintiff had known she would have no job at the end, she
would not have taken more than twelve weeks of leave; thus, "mis-
leading" and failing to reinstate the plaintiff interfered with her
FMLA rights.227
219. Id. at *13 n.8.
220. Gadinski v. Shamokin Cmty. Hosp., 116 F. Supp. 2d 586, 590-91 (M.D. Pa. 2000);
Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 939-40 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121
S.Ct. 2548 (2001) (mem.).
221. Gadinski, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 590.
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 590 n.5.
226. Id. at 590-91.
227. Even though the court did not mention interference, one must interpret the case as find-
ing interference in order to justify the holding under the FMLA. If the court simply felt that the
20021
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V. ANOTHER FMLA NOTICE PROVISION IN JEOPARDY
The courts also struggle with another notice requirement, a
technical violation of which sometimes does not result in any harm
to the plaintiff. A provision in section 825.110(d) of the DOL regula-
tions requires that the employer notify an employee of his or her
eligibility under the FMLA, or lack thereof, prior to the leave.228 If
an employer fails to tell an employee that he or she does not qualify
for FMLA protection, the employee will be deemed eligible, and the
employer cannot deny the leave. 229
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, and several district
courts, have invalidated this provision as contrary to the plain lan-
guage of the FMLA.230 Similar to the arguments in the cases above,
these courts held that the FMLA contained no ambiguity as to eli-
gibility requirements. 231 Therefore, a regulation that allows noneli-
gible employees to receive FMLA rights should not receive defer-
ence under step one of the Chevron test.232 As with the cases invali-
dating 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c), these courts held that the regulation
could be valid if relief under the regulation required that the em-
ployee rely to his detriment on employer notice, or lack thereof.233
These cases are analogous to those described in the previous part
because they illustrate other courts' refusal to tolerate the DOL's
employer should have honored the agreement for six months of leave, the FMLA would not com-
pel this ruling and the plaintiff would have to rely on a breach of contract-type action to enforce
the agreement. Cf Brief of Amici Curiae Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. at 14,
Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-3319), available at
2001 WL 1191093 (arguing that employees have recourse under state or federal contract law
when the employees rely to their detriment on employer-provided leave of more than twelve
weeks). But cf. Thomas v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 251 F.3d 1132, 1137 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding em-
ployee handbook language entitled all eligible employees to FMLA leave, even though employer
was not covered by FMLA).
228. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) (2000).
229. Id.
230. See Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 2000); Dor-
meyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Sewall v. Chi. Tran-
sit Auth., No. 99 C 8372, 2001 WL 40802, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2001); McQuain v. Ebner Fur-
naces, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 763, 775 (N.D. Ohio 1999); Seaman v. Downtown P'ship of Balt., Inc.,
991 F. Supp. 751, 754 (D. Md. 1998); Wolke v. Dreadnought Marine, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1133,
1136-37 (E.D. Va. 1997).
231. E.g., Brungart, 231 F.3d at 796-97; Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 582. The FMLA clearly pro-
vides that it only protects employees who have worked for the employer for at least twelve
months and for at least 1250 hours during the previous twelve month period. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)
(1994).
232. See Brungart, 231 F.3d at 796-97.
233. See Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 582 ("If detrimental reliance were required, the regulation
could be understood as creating a right of estoppel . . . and such a right might be thought both
consistent with the statute and a reasonable method of implementing it, and so within the De-
partment's rulemaking powers.').
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method of enforcing regulations by allowing more than the FMLA
actually confers as a penalty for violation of a notice requirement. 234
VI. CHEVRON ANALYSIS
Even though many critics question the validity and useful-
ness of the Chevron test,235 it remains the most prevalent tool that
courts use to assess whether an agency has overstepped its author-
ity in issuing regulations. This Note argues that in promulgating 29
C.F.R. § 825.208(c), the DOL has overstepped its statutory (and
therefore constitutional) authority. The Supreme Court should in-
validate as contrary to the FMLA the portion of the regulation that
denies retroactive designation of FMLA leave without proper no-
tice,23 6 even without proof of interference with FMLA rights.
As demonstrated by the cases forming the circuit split on
this issue, courts can easily manipulate the simplistic yet vague
234. Obviously, if an employee begins leave before satisfying FMLA eligibility requirements,
employers face even more notice dilemmas. For example, in Sewall, an employee became "unfit
for work" and commenced leave in November, before he had worked the requisite twelve months
to receive FMLA protection. See Sewall, 2001 WL 40802, at *2. A month later, that employee had
worked the requisite number of months, became eligible, and received FMLA paperwork. See id.
He claimed that his leave began when he received the FMLA paperwork, and thus, he should
receive FMLA protection because he satisfied the FMLA eligibility requirements at that time. Id.
at *3. The court rejected this assertion and held that the employee's leave began when he first
became "unfit for work" and took a leave of absence, regardless of his eligibility or notice under
the FMLA. Id. at *5. When the employee countered that this was retroactive designation of
FMLA leave, the court replied that the employer could not possibly designate leave retroactively
for an employee who was not eligible for FMLA leave at the commencement of the leave. Id. at
*6. While this argument makes sense, the court ignored the fact that after December when the
employee became eligible, the employee could receive FMLA leave for twelve weeks going for-
ward. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(b)(3) (providing that an employer may choose the method of calcu-
lating the year in which the employee gets twelve weeks of leave, including the year forward
from the date any employee's first FMLA leave begins). The court does not mention whether new
FMLA leave could start in the middle of non-FMLA leave, if the employee becomes eligible. Such
a situation would present new notice problems for employers.
235. See Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Delegation: What Should We Do About It? Control-
ling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 993 (1999) ("Admittedly, the United
States Supreme Court cases have limited the application of Chevron more often than they have
applied it and the cases often are difficult to reconcile."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme
Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative
State, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 749, 750 (1995) ("The Supreme Court, however, has not applied the
Chevron test in a consistent manner. Its post-Chevron jurisprudence is so confused that it is
difficult to determine what remains of the original, highly deferential test.").
236. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) (2000) ("If the employer .. .fails to designate the leave as
FMLA leave.., the employer may not designate leave as FMLA leave retroactively .... In such
circumstances, the employee is subject to the full protections of the Act, but none of the absence
preceding the notice to the employee of the designation may be counted against the employee's
12-week FMLA leave entitlement.").
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Chevron test to reach any desired result.2 7 Furthermore, courts can
avoid use of the Chevron test altogether, as the Supreme Court of-
ten does without explanation. 238 This Note does not comment upon
the extensive debate regarding the continuing use and validity of
the Chevron test as it exists today. Rather, it uses the principles
behind the existing legal framework to address the narrow issue of
29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c). It employs the rationale and the common
sense concepts that form the basis of the Chevron test-statutory
interpretation and separation of powers-to argue that the regula-
tion is invalid.
A. The Constitutional Message of the Chevron Test
In Chevron, the Supreme Court unanimously established a
seemingly universal and straightforward two-step test for judicial
review of agency interpretations of agency-administered statutes. 239
First, the court must examine whether Congress has directly spo-
ken to the precise question at issue. 240 If the intent of Congress is
clear, the inquiry ends, and the court must give effect to that
congressional intent.241 If, however, the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the court must proceed
to step two to decide whether the agency's interpretation is based
upon a permissible construction of the statute.242 If so, the court
must defer to the agency interpretation. 243
The Supreme Court's message in Chevron was that an ad-
ministrative agency should receive broad deference in interpreting
a law unless the agency's action actually changes the law it seeks to
interpret. 244 This message is derived from the U.S. Constitution's
delicate separation of powers. 245
237. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1253, 1259 (1997) ("The flexibility that we have always seen in the courts' use of the defer-
ence concept has not disappeared, but it is now usually oriented around Chevron terminology.").
238. See, e.g., Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 167 (1986) (upholding a state health regulation
interpreting federal Medicaid statutes because the federal statute was silent on the specific
issue, without mentioning Chevron); see also Levin, supra note 237, at 1261.
239. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
240. Id. at 842.
241. Id. at 842-43.
242. Id. at 843.
243. Id. at 844.
244. See id. at 844-45.
245. See Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 235, at 989 (describing the delegation doctrine,
which requires legislation to include "intelligible principles" for measuring the scope and goals of
agency delegation).
[Vol. 55:261
FMLA AND THE CHEVRON TEST
The Chevron Court emphasized that the legislature alone
possesses the power to choose between conflicting policies. 246 At the
same time, the Court noted that often Congress does not have the
expertise to make certain choices, or simply does not consider a
matter at all.247 In these cases, the Court reasoned, Congress in-
tends for an administrative agency to fill in the gaps in the statu-
tory scheme, as long as the principal policymaking authority re-
mains with Congress. 248 In practice, congressional directives to
agencies are broad and general, eliciting concerns from scholars
that Congress has impermissibly delegated too much of its lawmak-
ing authority.249 Even with very specific legislation, however, unan-
ticipated issues still lead to gaps that agencies must fill. 250
The role of the courts is not to assess the wisdom of an
agency's policy choice, but merely to decide whether the agency
regulation "is a reasonable choice within a gap left by Congress." 25 1
A common perception is that agencies are continually pressing for
expansion of their powers. 25 2 The courts must ensure that agencies
do not expand their powers such that they are effectively enacting
laws that have not complied with the bicameralism and present-
ment requirements of the Constitution. 253 The courts will, however,
presume that an agency regulation promulgated under agency au-
thority properly delegated from Congress satisfies these constitu-
tional requirements. 254
B. The Chevron Test Today
In the thirteen years since Chevron, the Supreme Court's use
of the test has been criticized as inconsistent and incoherent. 25
246. See Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 865.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 843-44.
249. See Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 235, at 990.
250. See id. at 991.
251. Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 866.
252. See Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 235, at 991.
253. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes Law, be presented to the President of the
United States .. "); Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 235, at 992; see also Brungart v. BellSouth
Telecomm., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 2000) ('But when an administrative agency seeks
to improve legislation by altering the basic covering provisions that Congress has written into
law, it has gone too far. The rule of law in general, and separation of powers principles in par-
ticular, require that such administrative hubris be reigned in, and that the task of improving the
basic provisions of statutes be left to the same body that wrote them in the first place.").
254. See Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 235, at 993.
255. See id; Pierce, supra note 235, at 750.
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Originally lauded as a tide-change toward greater deference to
agency interpretations, 256 the Chevron test as applied now signifies
a less deferential attitude than originally supposed.257 Studies have
shown that the Supreme Court has not been noticeably more defer-
ential to agency interpretations since Chevron than before the deci-
sion.258
Furthermore, the Court's decisions have muddled the differ-
ence between the two steps of the Chevron test. Most decisions in-
validating an agency regulation either rely on step one, by divining
a clear and unambiguous congressional intent on the issue, or else
they do not use the Chevron framework at all. 25 9 To add to the con-
fusion, the second step of the Chevron test, whether the agency in-
terpretation is a reasonable construction of the statute, seems to
overlap with the Administrative Procedure Act's ("APA") "arbitrary
and capricious" standard for agency review. 260
The cases forming the circuit split over 29 C.F.R. §
82 5.208(c) 261 illustrate this confusion over the Chevron framework.
The district court in the McGregor case seemed to suggest that the
regulation failed step one of the Chevron test, namely that Congress
had spoken directly to the precise question at issue. 262 The Eighth
and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, did not attempt to deter-
mine which step of the Chevron test invalidated the regulation. 263
256. See Levin, supra note 237, at 1256. Some scholars argue, however, that evidence indi-
cates that the six Justices who heard the Chevron case did not intend for the case to effect a
major transformation in administrative law. See id. at 1257.
257. See id. at 1257-58.
258. See id. at 1258 (citing a study by Professor Thomas Merrill). Professor Merrill surveyed
all of the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions involving an agency deference question from the 1981
Term through the 1990 Term. Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron
Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 359 (1994). He found that Chevron U.S.A., decided in 1984, had
not made a dramatic difference in the frequency with which the Court deferred to an agency
interpretation of statutes. Id. "If anything, the number of deference cases and the rate at which
the Supreme Court accepted the agency view went down somewhat after Chevron was decided."
Id. Even more counterintuitive to the idea that Chevron should result in greater deference to
agency view, Merrill found that where the Court did apply Chevron, it was less likely to defer to
agency interpretation than when the Court did not invoke the Chevron standard at all. Id. at
359-60.
259. See Levin, supra note 237, at 1258.
260. See id. at 1254 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1996)); see also Levin, supra note 237, at
1274-75 (citing Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 615-16 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Chevron is principally
concerned with whether an agency has authority under a statute .... The only issue here is
whether [the agency's] discharge of that authority was reasonable," an issue that "falls within
the province of traditional arbitrary and capricious review.")).
261. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) (2000).
262. See Cox v. AutoZone, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1369, 1376 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
263. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 939-40 (8th Cir. 2000) (same),
cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2548 (2001) (mem.); McGregor v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 1305, 1308
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Due to this current confusion, this Note will discuss issues
that permeate both steps of the Chevron test. In this case, dividing
the framework into two steps results in redundancy and incoher-
ence, as the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits implicitly realized. For
example, if the analysis concentrates on step one of the Chevron
test, as the Supreme Court most often does, 264 one must decide
whether Congress left a gap that 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) should fill.
The outcome depends on how one defines this gap.
Because of this confusion, it is possible to reach the same re-
sult by two different, though ultimately related, routes. One can
argue that Congress left gaps for simply ministerial provisions to
implement the FMLA, such as a notice provision. Therefore, one
could then proceed to step two of the Chevron test and argue that
by creating the possibility of extending leave beyond twelve weeks,
the DOL filled this gap in a way that made law contrary to the
statute. On the other hand, one could argue that Congress left no
room for the DOL to allow FMLA leave to extend beyond twelve
weeks, and therefore, there is no gap. Using this definition of gap,
one would never reach step two. Both arguments, however, utilize
the same concepts, which will be explored below, and result in the
same outcome. Therefore, this Note will not rely on the formalistic
Chevron framework, but will concentrate instead on the concepts
and rationale behind a Chevron argument.
Two recent Supreme Court cases applying the Chevron test
support the approach to Chevron utilized in this Note. First, FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. provides a useful explanation
regarding step one of the test, determining whether the statute con-
tains ambiguity. 265 In this case, the Supreme Court reviewed, and
struck down, the FDA's regulation of tobacco as a "drug," as defined
in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"). 266 The majority held
that a reviewing court should always examine the "meaning"-or
ambiguity-of a statutory provision by reference to its context.267
The court listed three elements to the context that a court must
(11th Cir. 1999) (applying Chevron, but stating that the regulation would fail under either step
of the test).
264. See Levin, supra note 237, at 1261 (noting that in 1997, no case analyzed under the
Chevron test had yet struck down an agency's interpretation by relying squarely on step two);
Note, A Pragmatic Approach to Chevron, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1724 (1999) (noting that the
Supreme Court has provided little guidance as to what constitutes a reasonable interpretation of
an ambiguous statute since the Court has "rarely, if ever, relied expressly on the second step to
invalidate an agency interpretation").
265. 529 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2000).
266. Id. at 131.
267. Id. at 132.
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consider: (1) the place of the provision in the overall statutory
scheme; (2) the existence of other statutes that may affect the
meaning of the provision; and (3) common sense as to the manner in
which Congress is likely to delegate a particular policy to an admin-
istrative agency. 268 Since the overall purpose of the statute was to
ensure "safe and effective" products, and since cigarettes could
never be safe, the Court reasoned that the overall structure of the
FDCA did not support the FDA's interpretation of cigarettes as a
"drug."26 9 Similarly, the approach advocated in this Note, and often
used in federal courts addressing the validity of 29 C.F.R §
825.208(c), significantly makes reference to the overall FMLA
scheme and the common sense of delegating this particular policy to
the DOL.
Second, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board provided some
rare guidance from the Court on invalidating a regulation under
step two of the Chevron test. 270 This case involved the FCC's inter-
pretation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which required
local exchange carriers to provide competitors with "necessary" ac-
cess to certain network features, denial of which would "impair" the
competitors' services. 271 In interpreting "necessary" and "impair,"
the FCC basically allowed the competitors blanket access to any
network features they wanted.272 The Court struck down this regu-
lation, even though the words carried ambiguity, reasoning that if
Congress had wanted to provide blanket access to the network fea-
tures, it would not have included the provision limiting access with
the "necessary" and "impairment" standards.273 Instead, the Court
reasoned, the statute would have stated that the carriers must pro-
vide whatever feature requested by the competitor. 274
Importantly, AT&T Corp. illustrates how both steps of the
Chevron test often collapse into one another to invalidate a regula-
tion. Whether the agency acted unreasonably, went beyond the
bounds of ambiguity, or blatantly contradicted a statute, the out-
268. Id. at 133.
269. Id. at 142-43 (reasoning that since cigarettes could never be safe, the FDA's regulation
of them would have to result in a ban on cigarettes, which would contravene Congress's clear
intent in other tobacco-specific legislation).
270. 525 U.S. 366, 390 (1999).
271. Id. at 388.
272. See id. at 389 ("[It is hard to imagine when the incumbent's failure to give access to the
element would not constitute an 'impairment' under this standard.").
273. Id. at 390.
274. Id.
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come remains the same. 275 Following suit, this Note will discuss
both reasonableness and blatant contradiction, recognizing that the
language of both steps leads analytically to the same conclusion.
C. The Evolution of the FMLA
Whether or not one can distill the constitutional principles
behind the Chevron doctrine into a simple test, the validity of 29
C.F.R. § 825.208(c) depends on whether the DOL changed the
FMLA's general scheme or merely elaborated upon it as Congress
intended. While Congress did provide the DOL with authority to
prescribe regulations to carry out the FMLA,276 Congress could not
have intended for the DOL to upset the policy balance enacted in
the statute by imposing a disproportionate penalty for violation of
this regulation.
The various cases examining the validity of 29 C.F.R. §
825.208(c) disagree on which "gap" the regulation attempts to fill.
Three possibilities emerge, and each possibility reflects a signifi-
cant policy choice in the overall FMLA scheme. The McGregor case
and its progeny suggest that 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) exploits a per-
ceived flexibility in the twelve-week number for leave entitle-
ment. 277 The Ragsdale case agreed with this argument and also in-
terpreted the regulation as elaborating upon the right to substitute
paid leave for FMLA leave in § 2612(d)(2) of the FMLA under the
U.S. Code. 278 Finally, the Secretary of Labor stated in an amicus
brief submitted in Donnellan v. New York City Transit Authority
275. DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE 1998-1999, at 54
(Jeffrey S. Lubbers ed., 2000) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENTS] ("Congress may have been unclear
and indecisive in many ways, but it at least determined that a potential competitor cannot sim-
ply show up and say to the existing [carrier]: 'Give me access to your network.' "); see also Whit-
man v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 903, 916 (2001) ("We conclude ... that the agency's
interpretation goes beyond the limits of what is ambiguous and contradicts what in our view is
quite clear.").
276. 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (1994).
277. See McGregor v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 1999) ("29 C.F.R. §
825.208 converts the statute's minimum of federally-mandated unpaid leave into an entitlement
of an additional 12 weeks of leave .... ").
278. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 939-40 (8th Cir. 2000)
("Rather than simply recognizing that the purpose of § 2612(d)(2)(B) was to disadvantage neither
employer nor employee by the existence of the FMLA when the employer already has a sufficient
leave policy in place, the Secretary of Labor has apparently seized upon the 'employer may re-
quire' provision in § 2612(d)(2)(B) to justify the imposition of a disproportionate penalty in all
cases where employers fail to designate leave as FMLA leave."), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 2548
(2001) (mem.).
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that the only gap the regulation sought to fill was that regarding
notice when paid leave was substituted for FMLA leave. 279
Resolving this question of "gaps" is not necessary to the reso-
lution of a Chevron analysis of 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) because the
regulation's impact on any one of these "gaps" results in an imper-
missible change in a politically significant element of the FMLA
scheme, the FMLA's context, to use the wording of the Court in
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.280 That scheme is the result of a
balance that FMLA supporters fought for years to attain. The
courts should not permit an administrative agency to make such a
significant change to legislation.
1. The Twelve-Week Entitlement Figure
All of the courts invalidating 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) express
concern with the DOL regulation's potential for extending the
twelve-week mandate. 28' The language of the FMLA is perfectly
clear and does not allow for any flexibility regarding the twelve-
week figure. 28 2 As a policy matter, the twelve-week figure repre-
sents a hard-fought compromise to enact the bill into law. 28 3
The FMLA bill faced stiff opposition from most Republicans
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and was vetoed twice by Presi-
dent Bush before becoming law. 28 4 The original FMLA bill, intro-
279. See No. 98 Civ. 1096, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11103, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1999) ("As
the Secretary's amicus brief explains, 'the designation regulations do not 'attempt' to redefine the
FMLA leave entitlement, but 'it is the aspect of notice which the regulation addresses.' '
280. 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000).
281. See, e.g., Ragsdale, 218 F.3d at 937 ("Under the FMLA, twelve weeks of leave is both the
minimum the employer must provide and the maximum the statute requires."); McGregor, 180
F.3d at 1308 ("The statute provides for only 12 weeks of leave."); Twyman v. Dilks, No. 99-4378,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12942, at *37 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2000) ("First, the plain language of the
FMLA is clear: all eligible employees are entitled to a total of twelve weeks of leave .... ").
282. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (1994) ([Ain eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of
12 workweeks of leave . . . ."); § 2612(d)(2)(B) ("An eligible employee may elect, or an employer
may require the employee, to substitute any of the accrued paid vacation leave, personal leave,
or medical or sick leave of the employee for leave . .. for any part of the 12-week period of such
leave . . ").
283. RUTH COLKER, AMERICAN LAW IN THE AGE OF HYPERCAPITALISM: THE WORKER, THE
FAMILY, AND THE STATE 142 (1998); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Equal Employment Advisory
Council et al. at 8-9, Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide Inc., 218 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-
3319) ("Congress was extremely cognizant that it was providing a maximum of twelve weeks of
protected leave under the statute .... Twelve weeks, therefore, was not a random figure but
rather the product of years of debate and compromise."), available at 2001 WL 1191093.
284. CLARA BINGHAM, WOMEN ON THE HILL: CHALLENGING THE CULTURE OF CONGRESS 107,
109-10 (1997). The FMLA was the first bill signed into law by President Clinton. See id. at 110.
Supporters of a mandatory leave policy, primarily labor and women's groups, said the country
was overdue for federal minimum requirements to bring business in line with the changing
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duced in 1985, provided for eighteen weeks of unpaid leave for
birth, adoption, or serious illness of a child, and twenty-six weeks of
unpaid leave for an employee's own serious health condition. 285 The
amounts were reduced in 1987 and 1989, and the leaves were com-
bined into one twelve-week leave period in 1990.286
A congressman explained in testimony before the House
Committee on Education and Labor that "that number was com-
promised down ... because we could get more people to vote for 12
weeks than we could for 26, including members of this committee
who didn't support the bill at the very beginning but began to sup-
port the bill after we modified the number of weeks involved."2 7 As
demonstrated in a House Committee Report, Congress considered
the twelve-week period a middle ground between the needs of fami-
lies and the concerns of employers, who maintained that it was sig-
nificantly easier to adjust work schedules or find temporary re-
placements over a shorter time period. 28
Given the significance of the twelve-week figure in the over-
all FMLA package, Congress could not have intended for a DOL
regulation to allow for any more weeks of leave. The cases affirming
29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) argue that, while the twelve-week figure is
absolute, the FMLA does not specify when the twelve weeks begin
and how FMLA leave is initiated. 28 9 To the contrary, the FMLA and
the DOL both identify the trigger for the twelve-week period:
demographics of the workplace. BRUCE C. WOLPE & BERTRAM J. LEVINE, LOBBYING CONGRESS:
How THE SYSTEM WORKS 172 (2d ed. 1996). But the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Bush ad-
ministration, and conservative Republicans argued that mandated leave was unwarranted gov-
ernment intrusion into the employer-employee relationship and would lead employers to cut
other employee benefits. Id.
285. See COLKER, supra note 283, at 142-43.
286. See id. at 143. See generally Donna Lenhoff & Claudia Withers, Implementation of the
Family and Medical Leave Act: Toward the Family-Friendly Workplace, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L.
39, 58-67 (1994) (detailing the legislative development of the FMLA).
287. COLKER, supra note 283, at 144; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-135, pt. 1, at 37 (1991) ("The
amount of time available for leave also reflects a compromise."), cited in Ragsdale v. Wolverine
Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 939 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 2548 (2001) (mem.).
288. H.R. REP. No. 102-135, pt. 1, at 37.
289. See Plant v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 935-36 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Moreover, because
the FMLA was intended to set out minimum labor standards, we do not believe that § 825.208(c)
is inconsistent with legislative intent merely because it creates the possibility that employees
could end up receiving more than twelve weeks of leave . . . ."); Chan v. Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr.,
No. 97 C 3170, 1999 WL 1080372, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 1999) ("The FMLA does not specify
when the 12 weeks of FMLA leave begin or how FMLA leave is initiated."); Ritchie v. Grand
Casinos of Miss., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 878, 881 (S.D. Miss. 1999) ("The statute does not specifi-
cally identify a triggering event or any mechanism by which employees and employers can calcu-
late the starting date of the 12-week entitlement.").
2002] 299
300 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:261
proper employee notice and actual leave. 290 Under the DOL regula-
tions, an employee must give an employer enough information to
make the employer aware that the employee needs FMLA-
qualifying leave. 291 The employer should then inquire further to ob-
tain the details necessary to designate the leave as FMLA leave. 292
Once the employee has given proper notice and taken actual leave,
the FMLA twelve-week entitlement is triggered if the employer de-
termines that the employee meets the other requirements of the
FMLA, such as eligibility and having a serious health condition. 293
No court has even suggested any problem with the DOL regulation
giving employees such lenient notice requirements. The FMLA and
DOL scheme clearly provides for a trigger to the twelve-week enti-
tlement and leaves no gap for 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) to fill.
The Chan court, in upholding 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c), rea-
soned that the regulation imposes qnly a modest burden on employ-
ers to avoid having to offer more than twelve weeks leave. 294 Many
employers would argue that a notice requirement is not modest at
all, since employees often do not give what the employer feels is
adequate information to designate leave as FMLA qualifying.295
290. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(l)-(2) (1994) (requiring thirty days notice by employee before
foreseeable leave is to begin); 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c) (2000) ("An employee shall provide at least
verbal notice sufficient to make the employer aware that the employee needs FMLA-qualifying
leave .... ."); 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a) (2000) ("When the approximate timing of the need for leave is
not foreseeable, an employee should give notice to the employer of the need for FMLA leave as
soon as practicable under the facts and circumstances of the particular case.").
291. 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c).
292. Id.
293. See § 2612(a)(1).
294. See Chan, 1999 WL 1080372, at *9.
295. See, e.g., Hearing on the Family and Medical Leave Act [FMLA] of 1993: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce,
105th Cong. 9 (1997) (testimony of M. Theresa Hupp, Human Resources Director of Manufactur-
ing, Hallmark Cards, Inc.) ("[E]mployers must now question employees as to what types of ill-
nesses the employees and their family members have, in order to determine whether an absence
should be designated as FMLA leave. This requirement gives rise to problems under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which limits what employers can ask employees about their
physical and mental disabilities."); Oversight of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Children and Families of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 104th
Cong. 32-33 (1996) (prepared statement of Cynthia Graham, PHR Human Resources Analyst,
Southern States Utilities) ("An employee coming back from a two week vacation disclosed that he
had spent his time-off caring for a terminally ill relative and requested an additional twelve (12)
weeks of unpaid leave. Had the [employer] known that the employee was using paid leave for
purposes outlined under the FMLA, the two weeks could have been used as part of his twelve
(12) week entitlement .. . ."); Brief for Amici Curiae Equal Employment Advisory Council et al.
at 19, Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-3319) ("Ap-
parently, [the DOLl does not appreciate the paperwork burden this requirement generates for
employers with thousands-let alone hundreds of thousands-of employees, any number of
whom may be taking leave at any given moment."), available at 2001 WL 1191093.
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Even though the FMLA scheme allows employers to designate
FMLA leave retroactively if the employee does not provide adequate
information regarding the reason for leave,296 the adequacy of the
information is an after-the-fact determination made by the courts.
Litigation to determine whether proper notice was given is not a
"modest burden" at all.297 Further, if the law is to impose such bur-
dens, it should be Congress that does so, and decides whether or not
they are "modest," not an administrative agency or a court.
2. Paid Leave Substitution
The FMLA allows an employer to require employees to sub-
stitute paid leave under employer-specific leave programs for the
FMLA twelve-week entitlement so that employers never have to
provide more than twelve weeks of total leave. 298 As the Ragsdale
court stresses, this language protects both the employer and em-
ployee. 299 The employee may receive paid leave during FMLA leave,
while the FMLA does not add an additional twelve weeks of leave to
an employer's leave policy already in place. 300 Congress did not in-
tend to disadvantage those employers who have already provided
for a leave policy by enacting the FMLA. 301 In fact, one of the selling
points of the FMLA to conservative Republicans was the number of
businesses with leave plans already in place, making the FMLA
easier to implement. 30 2
The Chan court, upholding 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c), noted that
the FMLA does not specify how or when an employer must inform
296. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(d)-(e) (2000) ("If the employer learns that leave is for an FMLA
purpose after leave has begun . .. the entire or some portion of the paid leave period may be
retroactively counted as FMLA leave ... ").
297. Amici argue that upholding the notice regulations will eliminate the threat of additional
litigation over "these issues" by confirming that employers and employees have a duty to abide
by the notice regulations. Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Lawyers Association et al.
at 15, Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-6029), avail-
able at 2001 WL 1077954. Naturally, resolution of this case either way will eliminate litigation of
the issue. Both sides, however, will face litigation regardless of the outcome, either under the
regulation or under the interference prohibition in the statute. Either way, employers still must
provide notice of FMLA designation. The analysis offered by the court in Ragsdale will simply
determine the correct remedy for failure to provide proper notice.
298. See § 2612(d)(2); see also text accompanying notes 27-30.
299. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 938 (8th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 121 S.Ct. 2548 (2001) (mem.).
300. See id.
301. See id; see also McGregor v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 1999);
Twyman v. Dilks, No. 99-4378, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12942, at *39 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2000).
302. See WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 284, at 175 ("[Lobbyists] also argued that the policy
would not be difficult to put in place in part because many companies already had some sort of
plan giving workers time off for a new baby or family medical emergency.").
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the employee that paid leave will be substituted.30 3 This argument
fails to take account of another provision in the FMLA in which
Congress specifically encourages employers to adopt more generous
leave policies.30 4 Even if one agreed with Chan that the substitution
provision left a gap, a construction of the gap that disadvantages
employers with more generous leave policies would be manifestly
contrary to the statute.30 5 The regulation disadvantages employers
with leave policies because a technical violation of a notice provi-
sion would require employers to provide not only leave under their
own policies, but also an additional twelve weeks. 30 6 Many employ-
ers certainly find themselves more likely to be liable in a lawsuit
after the DOL implemented the regulation than before, a result the
FMLA expressly discourages. 3 7
3. Notice Before FMLA Designation
While the FMLA does address some notice requirements in
the statutory language,308 Congress likely meant for the DOL to ad-
dress the ministerial aspects of notice in the regulation. 30 9 In most
respects, the DOL regulations have done so in a manner that com-
plies with the intent of the FMLA.310 Section 825.208(c), however,
exceeds Congress's directive to the DOL simply to "carry out" the
FMLA; it changes the dynamic of the statutory scheme.
303. See Chan v. Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 97 C 3170, 1999 WL 1080372, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 23, 1999).
304. 29 U.S.C. § 2653 (1994).
305. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
306. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 938 (8th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 2548 (2001) (mem.).
307. See § 2653. Members of Congress have taken note of this unfortunate situation and
sponsored bills to amend the substitution provision because the FMLA too often conflicts with
employers' existing leave policies by adding an extraordinary administrative burden. See Family
and Medical Leave Clarification Act, H.R. 4499, 106th Cong. § 6 (2000); S. 1530, 106th Cong. § 6
(1999).
308. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1) (1994) (providing that employee give notice for foreseeable
leave); 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1994) (providing notice of "key employee" designation); 29
U.S.C. § 2619 (1994) (requiring the posting of FMLA rights).
309. See 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (1994) (instructing the DOL to prescribe regulations to carry out
the FMLA); see also Plant v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 935 (6th Cir. 2000) ("The FMLA
itself is silent as to the notice an employer must give to an employee before designating his paid
leave as FMLA leave."); Chan v. Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 97 C 3170, 1999 WL 1080372, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 1999) ('[Tihe FMLA itself does not specify what notice an employer must pro-
vide an employee regarding FMLA leave.").
310. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.301 (2000) (requiring that employees' FMLA rights must be set forth
in employee handbook and written notice); id. at § 825.302 (providing that employee notice for
foreseeable leave); 29 C.F.R. § 825.303 (2000) (employee notice for unforeseeable leave); 29
C.F.R. § 825.304 (2000) (penalty for improper employee notice).
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First, where Congress desired explicit notice provisions with
significant consequences for their violation, Congress provided for
them in the text of the statute.311 For example, Congress created for
certain "key employees" a notice regime that resembles what the
DOL attempted to create in 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c).3 12 While the
FMLA requires employers to restore employees to their positions
after taking FMLA leave, the statute exempts employers from this
requirement when denying restoration to an employee is "necessary
to prevent substantial and grievous economic injury" to the em-
ployer.313 Employees affected by this exception are defined as sala-
ried, eligible employees who are among the highest paid ten percent
of the employees at the place of business. 314 Employers may only,
however, deny restoration to key employees when the employer has
notified the employee of this designation and intent not to re-
store. 315
Therefore, Congress fully considered a scheme where lack of
employer notice should preclude an employer from denying an em-
ployee an FMLA right. Furthermore, Congress declined to utilize a
similar scheme when employees substitute paid leave for unpaid
leave. In that situation, the FMLA is neither silent nor ambiguous
and therefore does not invite DOL elaboration. Section 825.208(c)'s
imposition of this approach for substitution of paid leave contra-
dicts the intent of Congress and exceeds the DOL's authority under
the statute. Applying common sense regarding Congress's delega-
tion to the DOL, as the Court instructs in Brown & Williamson To-
bacco,316 indicates that the gap in the FMLA regarding notice was
not a delegation to the DOL to act in the manner of 29 C.F.R. §
825.208(c).
Second, even though the Secretary of Labor stressed that the
regulation only deals with the subject of notice, 31 7 the regulation
has an impact on much more than notice. The cases evaluating 29
C.F.R. § 825.208(c) have clearly stated that the imposition of a no-
311. See Ragsdale, 218 F.3d at 938; Twyman v. Dilks, No. 99-4378, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12942, at *39-40 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2000).
312. See § 2614(b)(1).
313. § 2614(b)(1)(A).
314. § 2614(b)(2).
315. § 2614(b)(1)(C); see also Panza v. Grappone Cos., No. 99-221-M, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16390, at *4 (D.N.H. Oct. 20, 2000) (precluding defendant from arguing that plaintiff was key
employee because defendant did not inform plaintiff of that designation).
316. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
317. See Donnellan v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., No. 98 Civ. 1096, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11103, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1999) (quoting Secretary's amicus brief).
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tice requirement alone does not offend Chevron analysis.318 Rather,
it is the possible extension of the twelve-week leave entitlement
that exceeds the DOL's authority.3 19 Therefore, this regulation goes
far beyond filling in a gap regarding notice and cannot withstand
Chevron analysis.
VII. EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS ARE PROTECTED WITHOUT THIS
REGULATION
This Note advocates invalidating the portion of 29 C.F.R. §
825.208(c) that disallows retroactive designation of FMLA leave
and triggers the running of the twelve-week entitlement only upon
proper notice of FMLA designation. The actual notice requirement
does not offend Chevron analysis because, as mentioned earlier, one
could persuasively argue that a gap exists in the statute as to em-
ployer notice.3 20 But there is no such gap providing for the extension
of leave beyond twelve weeks. Employees' rights will be more than
adequately protected without this invalid provision because em-
ployees can bring claims under the FMLA provision prohibiting in-
terference with substantive FMLA rights. 321
The FMLA makes it unlawful for any employer to "interfere
with, restrain, or deny" the exercise of FMLA rights. 322 The DOL
regulations specify that any violation of the FMLA or DOL regula-
tions constitutes interference. 323 The DOL regulations further pro-
vide examples of interference: refusing to authorize FMLA leave,
discouraging an employee from using such leave, or manipulating
policies to avoid responsibilities under the FMLA such as reducing
318. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 939 (8th Cir. 2000) ("It
should be stressed that the court is not holding that any DOL regulation requiring employers to
designate leave as FMLA leave would be invalid."), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2548 (2001) (mem.);
Longstreth v. Copple, No. C97-4100, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16654, at *10 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 22,
1999) (holding that the McGregor holding stands for the "rather narrow proposition that this
regulation is invalid insofar as it purports to require the employer to provide more than 12 weeks
of leave time, unless the employer notifies the employee that her leave time is designated as
such").
319. See Ragsdale, 218 F.3d at 940.
320. See supra Part VI.C.3.
321. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (1994).
322. Id. In addition to prohibiting interference, the FMLA also prohibits discrimination or re-
taliation for exercising FMLA rights. See § 2615(a)(2). The employer actions that support a claim
of interference often also support a claim of retaliation, especially when an employee has suffered
an adverse employment action before bringing suit. See Schober v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., No.
IP99-1285-C-T/G, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12478, at *19 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 21, 2000) ('It is noted,
however, that actions which [the plaintiff] raises as retaliation may also constitute interfer-
ence.").
323. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b) (2000).
304
2002] FMLA AND THE CHEVRON TEST 305
work hours to avoid employee eligibility.3 24 Some courts have inter-
preted this section of the FMLA as governed by a strict liability
standard, holding irrelevant an employer's intent to violate any of
an employee's substantive FMLA rights.325
An employee can establish a claim for interference by prov-
ing, by a preponderance of evidence, that the employee is entitled to
the benefit of FMLA leave and that the employer interfered with or
denied that benefit. 326 The interference may come in the form of de-
nial of leave or an adverse action taken against an employee for
taking FMLA-qualifying leave.327 Furthermore, employer actions
that "chill" an employee's assertion of FMLA rights may constitute
interference, regardless of whether the employee ever even applied
for FMLA leave.328
Instead of allowing the employee an additional twelve weeks
of leave, as 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) does, the statutory FMLA scheme
for interference violations would give the employee a private right
of action, which would include whatever relief the judge finds ap-
propriate for the particular case.3 29 If the employee had not relied
on employer notice, the employer would not have interfered with
324. Id.
325. See Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the
employer's subjective intent is not relevant when the employer has violated any of the substan-
tive rights created by the FMLA); Williams v. Shenango, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 309, 317-18 (W.D. Pa.
1997) (engaging in traditional statutory construction to find that a claim under § 2615(a)(1) is
governed by a strict liability standard).
326. See O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1353 (11th Cir. 2000) (es-
tablishing standard for interference claim); Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 713
(7th Cir. 1997) (same).
327. See Schober, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12478, at *29 (construing termination of employee
after taking leave as interference); Williams, 986 F. Supp. at 321 (finding that denial of a leave
request as interference).
328. See Mardis v. Cent. Nat'l Bank & Trust, No. 98-6056, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7261, at *6
(10th Cir. April 15, 1999) (holding interference may occur regardless of whether employee actu-
ally applied for leave and subjected self to unwarranted consequences announced by employer);
Williams, 986 F. Supp. at 321 (holding a lack of assurances of job security for taking leave consti-
tuted interference).
329. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (1994) (prohibiting interference); 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) (1994)
(creating a private right of action). The United States argued as amicus that the Secretary rea-
sonably determined "that the predictability and ease of administration of a categorical rule make
it preferable to a regime in which an individual's entitlement to relief under the Act would turn
on a potentially difficult, retrospective inquiry into what steps the employee might have taken
had he receive timely notice." Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 20-21, Ragsdale v. Wolver-
ine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-6029), available at 2001 WIL 1082492.
While undoubtedly easier to administer, the categorical rule advocated simply contradicts the
statute, especially given that in some cases, Congress created a categorical rule and for this
situation did not. See supra notes 311-315 and accompanying text (examining where Congress
desired penalties for notice provisions and expressly provided for them in the statute).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
any substantive rights, and the employee would have no right of
action.
The case law supports the application of this remedy for im-
proper notice. The courts have defined interference broadly, includ-
ing violations of various notice provisions. 330 For example, the
plaintiff in Schober v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc. had taken extensive
days off to care for her ill son.331 After exhausting personal leave,
she inquired about FMLA leave. 332 The employer required a written
certification of her son's illness but provided no written guidance on
the plaintiffs FMLA rights and obligations, as required by the DOL
regulations. 3 3 Fourteen days after giving the plaintiff the certifica-
tion form, the employer terminated the plaintiff for excessive ab-
sences. 334 The employer argued that by failing to return the certifi-
cation form, the plaintiff had forfeited her FMLA rights.3 35 The
court held that a reasonable jury could find that the employer inter-
fered with the plaintiffs FMLA rights by failing to give her written
notice of her rights and obligations, including a fifteen-day time
limit in which she could return the medical certification form. 336 If
the employer had given proper notice, the court reasoned, the plain-
tiff would have had time to complete her duties under the FMLA
and would not have forfeited its protection. 337
As another example, the employer in Mitchell v. Continental
Plastic Containers, Inc. assessed the plaintiff a disciplinary point
for an absence arguably covered by the FMLA. 338 An accumulation
of points eventually led to the plaintiffs discharge. 339 The employer
argued that the plaintiff had not fulfilled his employee notice re-
quirements, namely giving the employer enough information to be
on notice that leave may be FMLA qualifying. 340 The court held that
330. See Mardis, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7261, at *6 (holding employer's conditioning em-
ployee's use of FMLA leave on employee's forfeiture of vested benefits constituted interference);
Schober, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12478, at *19 (holding improper notice of employee's obligations
and consequences for failing to discharge those obligations constituted interference); Mora v.
Chem-tronics, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1219-20 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (same); Mitchell v. Cont'l Plas-
tic Containers, Inc., No. C-1-97-412, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21465, at *34-35 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 3,
1998) (holding failure to post information regarding FMIA rights constituted interference).
331. See Schober, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12478, at *3-4.
332. Id. at *6.
333. Id. at *6, 9-10.
334. Id. at *15.
335. Id. at *34-35.
336. Id. at *29; see 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) (2000) (fifteen-day deadline).
337. Schober, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12478, at *29.
338. No. C-1-97-412, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21465, at *2 (S.D. Ohio March 3, 1998).
339. See id.
340. See id. at *40-41.
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the lack of notice on the employer's part might have led to improper
notice on the employee's part, which led to termination, and thus
supported a valid claim for interference. 341
Therefore, the FMLA still protects plaintiffs when proper
employer notice could have prevented their ultimate terminations,
without 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) creating a trap for unwary employers
that leads only to windfalls for plaintiffs.3 42 The courts need only
discern one additional element to analyze an interference claim (as
opposed simply to disallowing retroactive FMLA designation under
the regulation): employee reliance.
The Ragsdale court in the Eighth Circuit recognized the
harmony between the notice regulation and relief by an interfer-
ence claim.3 43 As mentioned above, the Ragsdale court would not
have invalidated a notice regulation based on interference. 344 Cases
with reasoning similar to Ragsdale combine to form the following
nonexhaustive list of ways lack of notice could interfere with an
employee's FMLA rights:
" Where the employee claims that the sole reason she ex-
ceeded her FMLA leave was the employer's lack of notice,
and with proper notice, the employee would and could
have returned to work at the end of twelve weeks;345
* Where the employee anticipated taking leave, such as for
elective surgery, and the employer's lack of notice caused
the employee to take more than needed at the current
time;346
341. See id. at *41.
342. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 939 (8th Cir. 2000), 121 S.Ct.
2548 (2001) (mem.). A recent Note in the Iowa Law Review also advocates invalidation of 29
C.F.R. § 825.208(c) based on the Chevron test, but advances from a different perspective. See
Ellen E. Daniels, Note, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: Does Twelve Weeks Really
Mean Twelve Weeks?, 87 IowA L. REV. 263 (2001). Daniels argues for amending the FMLA to fill
the void left by invalidation of 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c). Id. at 278-81. The present Note considers
in greater depth the lower court decisions and rationales, and recent applications and permuta-
tions of the Chevron test. In contrast to Daniels, this Note does not make the argument, however
valid, that amendment of the FMLA itself should fill the void. Rather, it presents ways to amend
the DOL regulations in order to pass muster under Chevron, which is potentially an easier, more
pragmatic, and less time-consuming alternative to Daniels' proposals.
343. See id. at 940.
344. See id.; Longstreth v. Copple, No. C97-4100, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16654, at *8 (N.D.
Iowa Oct. 22, 1999).
345. See Ragsdale, 218 F.3d at 939-40.
346. See id. at 940; Fry v. First Fid. Bancorp., No. 95-6019, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 875, at
*11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1996).
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* Where the employee anticipated taking leave and lack of
notice deprived the employee of the opportunity to sched-
ule the leave to coincide with work holidays;3 47
* Where the employee needed leave to care for a family
member, and with proper notice could have managed the
leave differently by arranging for other caregivers. 348
VIII. CONCLUSION
To give the Chevron test its full constitutional meaning,
courts must examine not only the form of agency action but also the
results and consequences. While 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c) seems at
first glance to fill in a ministerial term of the FMLA legislative
scheme, the regulation's results expand the FMLA beyond congres-
sional intent. The regulation operates to allow employees to take
more than twelve weeks of leave in circumstances where the em-
ployer has generously given the employee more than the FMLA
minimum. In doing so, the regulation alters the balance achieved by
Congress between the needs of families and the legitimate needs of
businesses. 349 Furthermore, disadvantaging employers in this way
provides no additional protection to employees beyond the employ-
ees' cause of action for interference with FMLA substantive
rights. 350 As a matter of constitutional law, and common sense, the
regulation as it stands now must be held invalid.
Shay Ellen Zeemer*
347. See Donnellan v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., No. 98 Civ. 1096, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11103, at *14 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1999).
348. See id.
349. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (1994) (setting forth the congressional purpose of the FMLA).
350. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (1994) (prohibiting interference with FMLA rights).
Many thanks to Matthew Festa, Chirag Shah, and Jeff Arnold for their extremely help-
ful editorial suggestions and hard work to make this Note publishable. In addition, Gavin Ap-
pleby and Professor Robert Belton provided valuable substantive assistance (whether or not they
realize it!). Finally, much appreciation goes to my family and friends, especially my mother, for
their support and encouragement outside of the law school context, which makes the inside-the-
law-school-context so much more productive and rewarding.
[Vol. 55:261308
